The Running Pirates: Out of the Park Baseball, and How I Like To Do It

I play me some Out of the Park Baseball (OOTP), and in my current version I took over the 2017 Pittsburgh Pirates, a middling team lacking direction and at a competitive crossroads.

I've now gotten used to building teams in OOTP around my aggressive running, defense-oriented style, dealing away expensive vets and bringing in lower cost, shorter term guys that fit my mold while acquiring and developing prospects who do the same.

Sure enough I've quickly turned the Pirates into a dangerous 100 win team with a low payroll.

Here's my strategy:



Hitting, or more specifically, Baserunning:
- When there's a man on 1st, we're run + hitting almost every time. Basically, we're stealing as long as the runner has an above average ability to steal bases (which on my team he usually does).
- When there's men on 1st/2nd, and the runner on 2nd is a good base stealer, we're double stealing almost every time regardless of the ability of the trailing runner. It usually works and even the lead-footingest runners get about 5-10 steals a year on my team because of this.
- We don't ever hit and run, but we do run and hit: Here, the runner looks to steal on a pitch and gives the hitter discretion on whether or not to swing.
- On a 0-ball count, the runner is given a straight steal sign instead of the run and hit.
- On a 1-0, 2-0, 2-1, or any 3-ball count, we run and hit. A pitchout on any of these counts may doom the runner but will give us a very good count or another baserunner.
- The Run and Hit is used in other counts at my discretion. Often, we just do it anyway and it just usually works.
- Unless he's a top hitter, the slowest runner in the lineup bats in front of the pitcher. This way, if he gets on with fewer than two outs, the pitcher can bunt him over.

The only times we won't aggressively steal:
- Our only runner is on 1st and either a pitcher or not a good runner.
- We're ahead by a lot late in the game and there's little value to padding the lead.
- The opposing catcher has a very good arm and we only have one baserunner.

- We realize we give away many baserunners caught stealing, and we run ourselves out of some innings. The number of steals and extra runs we produce running this aggressively is considered worth the collateral damage. My team scores about 5-6 runs a game, so if your metrics say we're costing ourselves runs... Scoreboard.
- On a base hit with a runner rounding 3rd and the ball in the OF, we almost always send the runner home instead of holding him at 3rd regardless of the quality of the outfielder's arm. Even with a below average runner, we usually score. The runner has to be incredibly slow and/or the outfielder has to have a laser cannon of an arm for us to consider holding the runner at 3rd.

Defense:
- Every fielder must be rated average or better at his position. Typically we expect at least 55 defense on a 20-80 scale for a regular.
- Defensively, we shift every pull hitter. In DP situations, the infield plays regular DP depth but the outfield shifts, and we will hold the runner if he's a steal threat.
- We'll shift but guard 3B vs a LH pull hitter who can bunt.
- Even against a normal hitter, we usually weak-shift the infield to the hitter's pull side.
- We sub in defensive improvements in the final 1-3 innings, depending on the hitting prowess of the fielder to be subbed out.
- If we're about to pull a pitcher and he comes up to bat with 2 outs and the bases empty in the mid/late innings of a tight game, we'll let him bat and punt the PA rather than wasting a potentially valuable pinch hitter in a spot with a 0.1 run expectancy, especially if his reliever will be expected to work multiple innings. (P.S. Those of you who support the DH in the NL... I honestly wouldn't mind it in these situations)

Pitching:
- Pitchers must have average or better scouted control. Keeping walks low is our top pitching priority.
- Our pitchers never intentionally walk anyone.
- Absolutely no fastballs to a pitcher batting with a runner on 1st, unless he has two strikes and will likely swing away. Don't make it easy for him to bunt. Breaking and offspeed pitches are harder to get down.
- The starting pitcher's goal is to get through the lineup 3 times. Our rule is to pull the SP after a max of 110 pitches or 27 batters, whichever comes first. He may face another 1-2 batters beyond that on an incidental basis. If tired but he has 2 outs and we think he can get out of the inning, we may let him try to finish the inning.
- We have a 6 man rotation... sort of. We have one swingman who is a technically a 6th starter but is used as a reliever when it's clear he won't be needed during the current rotation turn (which is usually). This can be a great spot for a young pitcher with good stuff who struggles with his control, or struggles to get through a lineup more than twice.
- We may also do the same relief deal for the 5th starter if we have days off and can skip the 5th slot in a rotation turn.
- The rotation does not follow a strict order. SPs are sorted based on their performance with the highest rested starter going next. This usually keeps the pitchers in a particular order, but pitchers can leapfrog one another in the order depending on how they pitch, rest, and days off.
- We technically have a 6 man bullpen, but with our use of the back end starters as swing-relievers, it's more like 7-8. Generally, we like to have 4 relievers who can work longer and 2 shorter relievers who could setup or pass for closers on most teams. Ideally, several of our relievers have the stamina to be starters or are former starters.
- Our bullpen is purely by committee. No one has a sole dedicated role, or can solely expect to pitch in particular innings or situations. We may use short men in middle innings if it makes sense, or a longer-reliever to close a game. That said, shorter relief guys generally get the conventional 3 out saves, and longer guys work longer, middle relief or mop up situations.
- We avoid pitching relievers when they're tired or have thrown back to back games. In a fireman situation, if we feel he's well-suited to get 1-2 crucial outs, we may go ahead and throw him there. Usually, these pitchers rest.

We vulture saves whenever possible:
- If ahead by a lot, we'll put in a longer reliever after 6 innings and ask him to finish the last 3 innings for the long save.
- If a reliever enters in the 7th-8th with a 1-3 run lead and we pull ahead by 4+, we'll ask the reliever to finish the game for the save.
- This save-padding is largely to add morale and value for future contracts or trades. GM's and agents tend not to be bright about counting stats like this.
- If a long man's attempting a long save but the game gets back into a 1-3 run save situation, we'll sub in a conventional short reliever for a conventional save.

- When possible we try and get multiple innings out of relievers. The only time we make a mid-inning pitching change is if a pitcher runs out of gas or is otherwise struggling. We deploy for matchups on an inning-to-inning due-up basis, not a batter-to-batter basis.
- We double switch liberally. We try and place the pitcher in the slot that just batted or close to it, if we can sub in a decent player at that position in the prior pitcher's slot.

Personnel:
- Once I took over we quickly dealt anyone who is older, not a particularly good fielder, or expensive over a long term... never minding the expense of short term damage to player morale or fan interest. I took a bath of fire trading Andrew McCutchen and his crappy defense ASAP to the Cubs for Javy Baez and prospects. We actually made that trade during a series at Wrigley! "Happy trails, Cutch. Your new team is down the hall. Tell Javy he can come over when he's ready."
- With trades we seek to add either add unproven potential MLB regulars, pricier quality veteran discards (the Cubs offered Javy when we shopped Cutch, so the AI was looking to trade him), or prospects that display upside plus qualities we value: Control and stamina for pitchers, or speed, defense, contact and plate discipline for hitters.
- We generally trade by shopping a player and seeing who is offered, rather than reaching out to try and land a specific player. We'll then seek to add opposing players of value to an established trade proposal where applicable.
- We'll generally look to quickly deal (or add to a deal) any prospects of value who are unhappy, or who don't appear to have long term potential with the organization (whether they're blocked, they're not good fielders or have other substantial shortcomings that inhibit their role on our MLB team).
- We don't try to fill all 40 spots on the 40 man roster right away. We leave 5-10 spots open at the start of the year to provide the freedom to add desired callups or optionable acquisitions.
- We draft by talent early and by tools late. We often end up picking a lot of hitters in early rounds and a lot of pitchers in later rounds.
- We don't mind picking multiple guys in the Rule 5 any more than we mind skipping it. The team I currently have is pretty much what I want but in a rebuild situation I'll often try and get a bullpen arm, maybe a useful bench player.

Minors:
- Every affiliate should have 14+ batters and 13+ pitchers. Ideally a team has 14-15 available pitchers. I don't mind overloading a team in the short run, but eventually I want upside guys or productive players playing regularly.
- Every MiLB manager is ordered to not intentionally walk or pitch around hitters, to avoid bunting, and not to hit and run. Each given hitter should steal or not steal based on his ability. Managers are usually advised to set lineups in order from the top performing hitters on top to the weakest performing hitters at the bottom. We don't care if the leadoff guy can't steal or if the middle of the order doesn't hit dingers. We mostly care if guys consistently hit and field well.
- The only hitters who are allowed to bunt are hitters who have struggled through 100+ PA, and only according to his skill at bunting. Hitters who are weak at bunting will never be asked to bunt.
- Any hitter or pitcher who is even mildly injured is benched until healed.
- While we seek to play prospects regularly, we spread playing time across the board to start the year and try to regularly play hitters who perform the best at a given level.
- Defensive subs are often used starting in the 7th inning with a lead. This not only helps the relief corps, but allows for a possible PA for the subs since these players aren't getting regular starts.
- Ideally, every player gets 1-2 early season starts at every position he has demonstrated an ability to play.
- We mostly worry about positional fit once a player gets to the AAA level. Either way, if there's no long-term potential MLB fit, we look to deal him.
- Similarly, after our top SPs at each level make 2-3 early season starts, we'll move them to the bullpen and use lesser-used relievers as extended 'openers' for a couple weeks to get everyone some extended work, and help preserve the starters. After every pitcher on the staff has logged about 10 innings, we slot starting pitchers based on performance. The best pitchers start. The next best pitchers are asked to setup and close. Those who don't do well as starters work out of the bullpen. Some top relievers may continue to get used as openers, and over time may stretch out into full time starters.
- Any pitcher who is tired is shelved until he is fully rested. This spreads out the workload to other relievers.
- Even if a player is best suited for short season A ball, we may start his season in full season A ball to keep him active and get him some work if his tools indicate he can handle it, or the A ball teams have a need he can fulfill in the short run. Unless he performs well, he'll be sent back to short season ball once those seasons begin.
- Unhappy players who have no trade value or organizational upside are released.
- When making MLB trades, we sometimes look to have other teams throw in quality non-prospects if they meet a particular affiliate's needs, allow for better placement of other org players at that position (if everyone in the org is playing above their ideal level due to affiliate needs and talent limitations), or have other MLB-level upside that isn't seen by that org or scouts.
- If a player reaches an age older than most others at a given level, and he's not performing at his given level, we may release him rather than send him down, unless he can be traded or can be suitably added to a trade.

Would I recommend this approach?

It's fun, but do whatever you want.

10 Interesting Items To Me About The 2018 MLB League Splits

All data is courtesy of Baseball Reference.

Needless to say, this list of quick thoughts is by no means comprehensive. Do your own digging and research to learn more, and if you think you can contradict me on any opinions, I imagine you're right.

- There's very little substantial difference between age groups in batting average or OBP. The only difference is that slugging about 20 points for hitters older than 30.

- Hitters who swung at the first pitch slugged .442, compared to hitters who didn't at .395. Their OBP improved by 20 points after the 1st pitch but their average dropped 23 points.

- Hitters who took a 1st pitch strike batted 218/264/349. Maybe swinging away at that first pitch is a better idea.

- When teams didn't IBB the hitter with a man on 2nd and 1st base empty, the hitter batted 240/328/390, compared to 241/308/402 with the bases empty.

- With the bases loaded and 2 out, batters hit a paltry 231/296/409, with a run expectancy in that situation of 0.616. Pitchers are probably best off just piping it and hoping for the best.

- High leverage: 249/322/402. Medium leverage: 251/320/414. Low leverage: 245/315/409. The slashes are all basically the same. Perhaps the leverage doesn't matter as much to a hitter's performance as people think.

- Aside from obviously the 1st inning, the highest OPS by inning came in the 4th-6th innings, indicating that tiring starters and long relievers are easier to hit off of. Along with the idea of the opener, perhaps managers would benefit plugging another quality reliever in one or more of the middle innings... or at least pulling struggling starters before the 5th and letting a good reliever bridge the gap. The notion of a pitching staff of 12 power relievers that can consistently work multiple innings doesn't seem too bad.

- Three True Outcomes OPS (out of play HR, walks and strikeouts only) is .836.

- Balls pulled to LF: .416 average, 1.203 OPS. Balls pulled to RF: .326 average, .950 OPS. This may be selective memory, but I believe LH power hitters get shifted a lot more often, because a RHB shift makes it harder for the 1B to cover the bag in time on a grounder. However, LHBs who go opposite field OPS 88 points higher (.784 to .696) than RHBs who go oppo to RF.

- No park saw more walks than Wrigley Field (614), with the next closest being Yankee Stadium at 596 (granted, the Cubs hosted a one game playoff tiebreaker after the season). No park saw fewer than Safeco Field (402), with the next closest (Comerica Park) seeing 443.

Why would teams try to win in a lost season?

Check this out.

The Mariners are over 10 games out of 1st place in the AL West, and well below .500. Why would they trade two fringey prospects (Ezequiel Carrera, Juan Diaz) to get back Russell Branyan in a lost season? There are two simple reasons, one being much bigger to the Mariners than the other.

Even if the team and many fans (such as many reading here, myself included) have given up on the season, many local/regional fans still might have an interest in attending Mariner games, so long as the team can make a significant effort to win, i.e. not make the cost and time invested to see a game a complete waste of their time. A team that scores 3 runs a game and is clearly/obviously punting the season isn’t going to draw most casual fans.

But believe it or not, the ticket sales side of the equation is the small part. Ticket sales, while valuable, make up a minority of the team's revenue. The biggest reason why Jack would want to buff up 2010’s team in a lost season is that the team's in-season performance from here on out does matter to the team’s relationship with FSNW and ESPN Radio, given the networks are paying the Mariners a lucrative sum for their media contracts.

A better team that competes despite the record equals more game-to-game interest which means more ratings. More interest in the team in 2010 means more viewers in 2010 which means higher average ratings during 2010 as well as over the life of the current contract, which means more ad dollars down the line.

If ratings for Mariners broadcasts tank, a) FSNW loses money in the long run as advertisers can cite lowered average ratings as justifiable leverage to lower the price on ad spots with the network and b) the Mariners may lose out on money from a new radio or TV contract down the line, as the network side will cite low ratings from this period as justification for low-balling the M’s when it comes time to negotiate a renewal. Sure, the Mariners have a 10 year, $300 million deal with FSN through 2020, but let's say the team wanted to buy out and jump to a more lucrative deal, or let's say FSN wanted to nix the deal. Don't forget the radio deal with KIRO ($5.5 million per year) only lasts through 2011. There is still plenty of leverage, as well as money, that can be gained and lost by what team they elect to field for the rest of 2010.

Even if the team's playoff chances in a vacuum make upgrading the 2010 roster seem like a waste of time, doing so could have an impact that reaches way beyond the field, and way beyond 2010.

Seattle Mariners minor league EMERA for June 2010

Sorry for the delay in Net Runs posts: The preceding games will get caught up later tonight, along with posts for a couple of other special items.

Following up on the Seattle Mariners minor league system's pitching, here is the Mariners minor league EMERA for all eligible pitchers* based on season pitching totals current as of yesterday. Pitchers are broken down by tiers: Ignoring all other developmental concerns, you could hypothetically slot the 1st tier in AAA, the 2nd tier in AA, the 3rd tier in High A and the 4th tier in Low A. On a more relevant scale, you want AAA pitchers in the 1st tier, not the 2nd tier or below... and you expect single A pitchers in the 3rd or 4th tier, so they're doing well if slotted higher.

And of course, EMERA is designed to estimate a pitcher's potential MLB ERA, so if his EMERA looks like a decent MLB ERA, that pitcher theoretically could pitch in the bigs right now.

(Ryan Feierabend is currently pitching in AAA and has enough innings to qualify, but I included his High A totals in parentheses as a point of comparative reference, as he has enough innings at that level to qualify as well.)

* - Minimum of 10 IP

Player - 1st Tier	Lvl	EMERA
Brian Sweeney	AAA	3.74
Robert Rohrbaugh	AA	4.43
Garrett Olson	AAA	4.80
Edward Paredes	AA	4.96
Anthony Vasquez	A+	5.14
Anthony Varvaro	AA	5.23
Michael Pineda	AA	5.42
Stephen Penney	A+	5.45
Mauricio Robles	AA	5.50
Anthony Vasquez	A	5.51
Steve Bray	AA	5.59
Ryan Feierabend	AAA	5.61

Player - 2nd Tier	Lvl	EMERA
Steve Palazzolo	AAA	5.66
Steven Hensley	AA	5.78
Aaron Jensen	AA	5.94
Maikel Cleto	A+	5.95
Josh Fields	AA	5.98
(Ryan Feierabend)	A+	6.06
Chad Cordero	AAA	6.10
Chris Kirkland	A	6.39
Brian Moran	A	6.71
Dan Cortes	AA	6.71
Luis Muñoz	AA	6.75
Andrew Carraway	A+	6.85
Taylor Stanton	A	6.90

Player - 3rd Tier	Lvl	EMERA
Mumba Rivera	AA	6.91
David Pauley	AAA	6.99
Steven Richard	A+	7.16
Chris Seddon	AAA	7.19
Levale Speigner	AAA	7.21
Luke French	AAA	7.24
Andy Baldwin	AAA	7.31
Jake Wild	A+	7.34
Steven Shell	AAA	7.38
Erasmo Ramirez	A	7.57
Cheyne Hann	A+	7.67
Jon Hesketh	A	7.73

Player - 4th Tier	Lvl	EMERA
Mike Koplove	AAA	7.76
Jose Jimenez	A	8.08
Bobby LaFromboise	A+	8.28
Blake Nation	A+	8.31
John Housey	A	8.41
Yusmeiro Petit	AAA	8.55
Kenn Kasparek	A+	8.65
Nick Czyz	A+	9.66
Brandon Josselyn	A	9.85
Marwin Vega	A+	9.96
James Gillheeney	A	10.49
Daniel Cooper	A	11.74
Taylor Lewis	A	12.25
Tyler Blandford	A	14.51
Ryan Moorer	A+	14.92

Seattle Mariners Net Runs for 6-12-2010 (San Diego 7, Seattle 1)

Team	Player	Net Runs	Hit	Pitch	Def	Base	EXERA	PitOuts
SEA	Cliff Lee	-0.835	-0.784	0.330	-0.381	0.000	2.78	21
SEA	Rob Johnson	0.718	0.171	0.000	0.547	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Mike Carp	0.114	0.326	0.000	-0.212	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Chone Figgins	0.341	-0.005	0.000	0.346	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Jose Lopez	-1.982	-0.976	0.000	0.000	-1.006	0.00	0
SEA	Josh Wilson	-1.016	-0.198	0.000	-0.818	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Milton Bradley	0.388	-0.211	0.000	0.599	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Franklin Gutierrez	0.285	-0.048	0.000	0.333	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Ichiro Suzuki	0.924	1.530	0.000	-0.606	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Sean White	0.052	0.000	0.052	0.000	0.000	1.87	1
SEA	Brandon League	0.125	0.000	0.125	0.000	0.000	1.61	2
SEA	Casey Kotchman	-0.671	-0.671	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Michael Saunders	-0.831	-0.831	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Eliezer Alfonzo	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	SEA Luckbox	0.283	0.283	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Don Wakamatsu	-0.262	0.000	-0.262	0.000	0.000	0.00	0

Team	Player	Net Runs	Hit	Pitch	Def	Base	EXERA	PitOuts
SDP	Wade LeBlanc	-0.604	-0.448	-0.253	0.097	0.000	3.52	18
SDP	Yorvit Torrealba	1.095	0.089	0.000	1.006	0.000	0.00	0
SDP	Adrian Gonzalez	1.829	1.692	0.000	0.137	0.000	0.00	0
SDP	David Eckstein	0.135	-0.031	0.000	0.166	0.000	0.00	0
SDP	Chase Headley	0.892	0.084	0.000	0.677	0.131	0.00	0
SDP	Jerry Hairston	-0.075	-0.045	0.000	0.614	-0.644	0.00	0
SDP	Scott Hairston	-1.528	-0.419	0.000	-1.109	0.000	0.00	0
SDP	Tony Gwynn	1.289	0.166	0.000	1.123	0.000	0.00	0
SDP	Chris Denorfia	-0.001	0.223	0.000	-0.055	-0.169	0.00	0
SDP	Luke Gregerson	0.243	0.000	0.243	0.000	0.000	1.14	3
SDP	Will Venable	0.606	0.522	0.000	0.084	0.000	0.00	0
SDP	Mike Adams	0.031	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.000	2.91	3
SDP	Edward Mujica	0.186	0.000	0.186	0.000	0.000	1.62	3
SDP	Oscar Salazar	2.385	2.385	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
SDP	SDP Luckbox	0.424	0.424	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
SDP	Bud Black	-0.283	0.000	-0.283	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
	Petco Park	4.257	0.000	0.000	-4.257	0.000	0.00	0.380
	RE/Inning: 0.380

Player of the Game: Oscar Salazar (2.385 hitting NRuns on pinch home run)
Padres with 1.000+ NRuns: 4 (Torrealba, Gonzalez, Gwynn, Salazar)
Padres defense: 2.740 NRuns

Mariners defense: -0.192 NRuns
Mariners with 1.000+ NRuns: 0

Goat: Jose Lopez (-1.982 NRuns: -0.976 hitting, 0.000 fielding, -1.006 running)

******

Three interesting topics from this game:

- Twice the Mariners loaded the bases with less than two outs, and both times they came up empty.

1st inning: With no outs and the sacks jacked, Jose Lopez hit a groundball to 3B that 3B Chase Headley astutely threw home for the force out to save a run (and cut the RE by 0.677 runs). But despite the play being a bit slow and despite catcher Yorvit Torrealba struggling with the handle upon turning to throw to 1B, he still got Jose Lopez at 1st for the 5-2-3 double play, costing the Mariners a whole other run in run expectancy (1.006 to be exact). With one ill-timed groundball and a subsequent lack of hustle up the line, Jose Lopez gave up 1.683 NRuns. Josh Wilson's flyball to right was subsequently caught to end the inning (-0.671 NRuns).

8th inning: With one out and the bases loaded, Michael Saunders pinch hit for Rob Johnson... and struck out (-0.831 NRuns). Casey Kotchman pinch hit for Cliff Lee (after seven decent innings), and grounded to short to end the threat (-0.671 NRuns). The decision to pinch hit for Rob wasn't terribly curious, as he's not having a good season at the plate, but he did have a double earlier in the game and has shown a propensity to work some walks, while Saunders (though he's much improved from last season) has looked overmatched at the plate on occasion this season, especially in pressure situations. I can understand not wanting to bring groundball machine Kotchman to the plate with one out... but why not let Robo Rob hit with one out in that situation?

Unless Wak is tacitly admitting the season is lost and he's experimenting at this point (and a willingness to lean on Sean White and Brandon League in high leverage situations as usual along with a reversion to his usual lineup indicates this isn't the case), that first pinch substitution was probably not the best decision given all the factors. The Kotchman PH for Lee was fine: Kotch is probably the best guy to send up at that point.

But twice the Mariners had a great opportunity to pick up, on average, a couple runs, and each time they found a way to come up empty. It's little wonder they have one of MLB's worst records.

- Jerry Hairston's caught stealing play was actually a blown bunt and run by Wade LeBlanc, who didn't get the bunt down. But for consistentcy's sake, I always score a CS in Net Runs against the runner regardless of the circumstances.

Here it still makes sense: Even a blown hit and run should be far closer than this play was, as Hairston was out by several yards. It's like Hairston changed his mind about going (probably not given Tony Gwynn Jr at 1st base was going, indicating a called double steal bunt and run), changed his mind again in a fraction of a second, and by the time he took off he got such a terrible jump he might as well have gone on contact as usual.

Whatever the case, Hairston timed the run so poorly that there was no saving that play.

- The National League's lack of a designated hitter creates some interesting game situations, as the pitcher is usually a terrible hitter and compels opposing managers to plan their in-game pitching strategy around the pitcher's spot in the lineup approaching.

That said, the intentional walk is usually not a good call statistically speaking, and Bud Black's decision to intentionally walk Rob Johnson with two outs and a man on 2nd in the 6th looked like a good decision with the pitcher Cliff Lee on deck. But a longer view of the situation shows that it probably was not.

Despite his double earlier in the game, Rob Johnson is not an effective hitter, and usually can be put out. Yes, with a man on 2nd going on contact, even a grounder into the outfield runs a significant risk of plating a run. The Pads had a 3-1 lead in their cavernous pitcher's park and the run expectancy in this situation at Petco Park is a mere 0.266 runs. Roughly a quarter of the time, the batting team gets a run or more in during this situation, and that's assuming they send a league average hitter (AL average: 261/332/410) to the plate. Rob Johnson (198/304/316) is decidedly below average as a hitter and not by any means a serious threat.

Even granted Rob's propensity for walks, if he does walk, that just puts him harmlessly at 1st base, leaving Mike Carp at 2B and raising the run expectancy to 0.374 runs... with the pitcher Cliff Lee coming up. Bud Black opted to take that situation in passing Rob Johnson intentionally, but facing Rob would have given his pitcher Wade LeBlanc a strong situation PLUS set up a strong situation for the 7th inning

In the 78-80% chance you get Rob Johnson out, the pitcher Cliff Lee (who likely finishes the bottom 6th against the Pads) is then due to lead off the 7th inning. Either the Mariners pull their dominant ace about 1-2 innings too early, easing up on your hitters as the M's go to their vulnerable bullpen... or in wanting another inning from Lee, the Mariners are forced to let him hit, most likely producing the 1st out and cutting their run expectancy in the 7th by nearly half: 0.380 runs with no outs and empty bases to 0.198 runs with one out and empty bases, undercutting their top 7th.

Black's decision helped get the Pads easily out of the 6th... but facing Johnson could have also gotten the Pads easily out of the 6th, while ALSO setting up an easy 7th inning, either for the defense as they likely pick up a quick out on the pitcher... or for the hitters if the M's lifted Lee for a pinch hitter, giving the Pads an easier pitch to face from the bottom 7th onward.

All this aside, the M's eventually imploded in the 8th with lots of help from bad defense and Oscar Salazar, rendering much of this moot. But Black's decision and the strategic implications provides an excellent look into how NL baseball differs from AL baseball, where the DH simplifies most managerial decision-making.

On ideas about the 2011 Mariners

Dave Cameron's piece on retooling for 2011 offered some interesting food for thought.

Dave proposed a couple of wire-level pickups:

Chris Resop: Yeah, he would be a great piece to pick up and test drive, but with the Braves leading the NL East and definitely looking at a postseason return, plus two late 30's pitchers in their rotation (Derek Lowe, Kenshin Kawakami) coming with a significant non-zero injury risk, along with a converted reliever (Kris Medlen) filling in for a currently injured young starter (Jair Jurrjens) who was already struggling before his DL trip, and their other fringe rotation options struggling at AAA (Jo-Jo Reyes, James Parr)... what if the Braves consider Resop a valuable piece of rotation insurance?

They wouldn't need Resop as a starter in October with a playoff-shortened rotation. But if one of the old men hits the DL during the regular season, if Jurrjens doesn't get back up to speed and/or if Medlen comes back to Earth and looks more like a reliever-quality arm (or gets hurt himself), they might need Resop's arm in the rotation, and his excellent work in AAA probably isn't lost on the Braves front office even if he's not on their 25 man roster.

Resop has a clause in his contract that says he's got to get called up by 6/15 this season or get released. But with Jesse Chavez struggling in the Braves pen, no assurances that Cristhian Martinez will be a useful reliever over the long term, a host of young option-able arms in the pen that could possibly unravel, and the elephant in the room of the two veteran starters (Lowe and Kawakami) struggling, I'm not convinced the Braves consider Resop as disposable as he'd need to be to make for an easy flier pickup.

Kila Ka’aihue and Alex Gordon: Gordon is admittedly an if-pickup in Cameron's scenario, but his focus is on Ka'aihue, who is admittedly a more do-able pickup. The question is whether the Royals would be keen on unloading him for a low price. They didn't mind unloading Dan Cortes and Derrick Saito from their system for Yuniesky Betancourt, but Cortes and Saito were young pitchers in a system full of them.

Ka'aihue, even rotting away in AAA, could be of use to the Royals down the road, and is only blocked because of the likes of Billy Butler and Jose Guillen. Guillen's most likely gone after this season, which could open up a spot at 1B or DH. Kansas City's not the brightest bulb in the box when it comes to talent assembly but they have to be mindful that Ka'aihue could help their team next year. It's going to take a more valuable piece than just a junk prospect or two to pry him away.

Both proposed ideas are predicated on the acquisition pieces being disposable assets to their respective teams, but a closer look indicates they may not be as disposable as it currently seems.

******

As for re-tooling the roster... there are 15 potential spots for an upgrade, but many of them are easy to fill.

Despite the M's struggles with the bullpen this season, a good bullpen is fairly easy to assemble and re-tool: Between failed starters and relievers with a hot fastball or a single fine out pitch, a lot of league-minimum guys offer potential to fill the spot. You do what most teams do: Go get a bunch of arms, put the best ones on the 25 man and stash the rest in AAA in case the audition winners don't cut it and/or guys get hurt. Closer is not as difficult a role to fill as many think: Incumbent David Aardsma was a waiver trade pickup that won an open audition for the role in 2009. If you think you need to replace him, an open audition among 4-5 qualified relievers can easily produce a guy that can get three outs in the 9th with a 1-3 run lead 30-40 times in a year.

The bench is always easy to assemble because the sort of parts you need to fill it (backup catcher, modular infielder, modular outfielder, pinch hit bats) typically only need to be a bit better than AAAA quality and thus the roles are cheap and easy to fill. Thus of the 15 given question marks, eight should not be terribly difficult to fill or at least address with a workable solution that doesn't significantly hurt the team.

As for the rotation, if we buy the notion that true #5 starters don't exist (and I can), then you only really need to fill one of the two open rotation slots with a genuinely good pitcher. It depends on how short you think Jason Vargas and Doug Fister fall of filling the #3 slot in the rotation, if an audition for the #5 role doesn't somehow produce a superior candidate.

Really, you don't need five strong starting pitchers... probably one or two good to great pitchers, one or two decent/average/useful starters and then an okay guy to round out the 5 slot with the understanding that the owner of this slot can and probably will fluctuate. The need to fill two spots is predicated on thinking of Vargas and Fister as back-end or replacement level arms... and that depends on your impression of their work this season. I don't consider either one anything resembling an ace, but both can be and have been mostly reliable starters (Fister's shoulder fatigue notwithstanding). You can focus on upgrading one rotation slot and then, like the bench and bullpen, assemble an audition of talent to fill the #5 slot while stashing alternatives in AAA Tacoma (if the minor league system hasn't produced potential alternatives by then).

We can agree the lineup needs to be upgraded. One or two additional lineup upgrades isn't an impossibility. From there, if supply and money make upgrading other spots infeasible, you can take fliers on guys or have the incumbents continue in those roles until you can upgrade. The easiest spots to upgrade on this roster are catcher, 1B and DH. These spots can probably get upgraded at an affordable cost or even filled by flier-type acquisitions. Shortstop and 3B aren't going to be as easy to address: Good players at either position don't come cheap. How you fill LF depends on how much you value hitting and defense. An incumbent could fill the role provided his shortcomings aren't in an area you highly value.

So while the team has a lot of potential upgrade spots, the situation isn't as dire as it seems at first glance. Even if many of the 2010 underperformers can be expected to continue to underperform, a lot of the potential openings are fairly easy to fill, meaning the M's should be able to focus their resources on filling the other needed roles.

Last night, Stephen Strasburg assured he's going to be a disappointment

... wait, what?

No, last night wasn't disappointing by any means. Last night a young and undisciplined Pittsburgh Pirates lineup spent seven innings getting played like a piano by Stephen Strasburg. And Strasburg didn't even get a lot of help from the home plate umpire, who was actually squeezing Strasburg on pitch calls quite a bit during the early innings. Strasburg got the Pirates to swing and miss pitches in the zone and got them to chase crisp breaking pitches out of the zone, ringing up 14 incredible strikeouts over 7 strong (to say the least) innings. Why would I claim disappointment is coming?

First, let's look down the road at his next potential outings.

- He's probably going to have another great game in 4 days at Cleveland during interleague play because the Indians are also awful.

- The White Sox come to DC after that, many of the ChiSox power bats are somewhat neutered outside of their bandbox home park and a lot of their mid-level bats are hackers.

- Then the Royals come to DC and the Nats will probably get him a home start versus yet another weak, hacktastic lineup.

- Then he goes to Atlanta's pitching friendly Turner Field and gets a relatively power-limp Braves lineup. It's here where he'll face his first actual test, as Atlanta currently leads the NL in walks plus has the 4th fewest strikeouts at the plate in the NL.

What's probably going to happen is Strasburg is going to throw two more terrific games, possibly a third against a somewhat respected (read: overrated) ChiSox lineup, building his already bloated hype machine as he did pitching against weakish Mountain West lineups in San Diego State's very pitcher-friendly home park during college.

But we're not going to see how relatively good Strasburg is until he offers his stuff to real, average-level MLB lineups laden with selective hitters, and he's not going to see one until he faces the Braves late this month.

The Nats planned the timing of his debut perfectly. The timing wasn't so much about starting his service time clock at the right time or controlling arb years, because they're just going to buy those out in a couple years by offering him a ridiculous contract to lock him up through his prime, as other teams have with their young phenoms (like Justin Upton with the D-Backs and Evan Longoria with the Rays). It wasn't even about ensuring several home starts: That could have been timed on several occasions during this season, and if it was about maximizing gate revenue they would have added him to the roster a month or two ago. Strasburg's hype would have assured a sellout in early April.

No, Washington's timing of Strasburg's debut was about ensuring his first starts came against crappy, beatable lineups that were easy for a talented pitcher to dominate. Instead of throwing him to the wolves and risking an up and down beginning that would undercut the hype around their now-franchise pitcher, they give him the best chance to come out looking dominant and make him look every bit like the pitcher he was hyped by everyone in the media, scouting community and blogosphere to be.

So how is he going to disappoint people? Pretty simple. As the season wears on, other teams are going to assemble scouting data on Strasburg, figure out how to attack him and maximize their chances of hitting and getting on base against him. Last night the Pirates were mostly blind squirrels, in part because they hadn't really seen Strasburg before and in part because, well, most of them aren't very disciplined hitters. Cleveland's hitters will likely suffer the same fate, as will Kansas City's.

Some of Atlanta's players will run into the same problem: Their rookie phenom Jason Heyward has struck out in over 21% of his plate appearances, not terrible but indicative that a deceptive power pitcher like Strasburg could own him. Veteran Troy Glaus has struck out in 20% of his PAs. If Nate McLouth (22% K's) plays, he could get owned. But everyone else in that lineup is fairly good at working the count AND avoiding the K. The key will be if Strasburg can induce a ton of groundballs if he doesn't rack up the K's.

And from there, Strasburg's opposition will get tougher. He gets the Mets at home to start July, and while they struggled early this season, they've got some good veteran hitters (David Wright, Jose Reyes, a surging Angel Pagan... and they might get Carlos Beltran back) that have seen the likes of power pitchers like Strasburg before and aren't going to be intimidated. Ditto with the Giants, who don't exactly have a vaunted lineup but do have a lineup of disciplined, productive veteran hitters (Bengie Molina, Juan Uribe, Aaron Rowand, Aubrey Huff et al) that aren't going to surrender like the Pirates did yesterday.

The tradeoff of the Nats giving Strasburg a soft landing is that, in dominating weaker lineups, Strasburg's going to elevate expectations so high that even if he does alright against better lineups and/or lineups that know when to attack him and when to back off, it's going to be deflating for fans when those outings aren't ownership-claiming 14 strikeout outings. That isn't fair, because Strasburg again could be effective against better lineups, but he will rarely if ever again be as good as he was yesterday and likely will be during his first 3-4 Major League starts.

Stephen Strasburg is good. Unfortunately, last night didn't tell us too much about exactly HOW good he is, other than he can dominate bad, intimidated lineups. A lot of good pitchers can dominate bad, intimidated lineups. Let's see how many batters Stephen Strasburg strikes out once the book's out on him and he's facing good MLB hitters that can get around on a 98 mph fastball and take pitches out of the zone. If he strikes out 14 batters against a lineup like the Philadelphia Phillies, St. Louis Cardinals or L.A. Dodgers, then I'll cream my pants with the rest of the saber-fanboys. But I doubt he's going to do that well even in his prime. He might have more days like yesterday... if he faces more bad, dominable lineups like that Pirates lineup.

Meanwhile, I don't foresee him throwing every start as good as that debut, which went as perfectly as the Nats could have hoped... mainly because of how well they timed his debut and who they threw him against. And now that Strasburg's shown people a performance beyond many's wild imaginations, he's ensured he'll never live up to the hype that casual fans have bought into. What we saw last night, and what we may see over the next 2-3 starts, is an exceptional deviation from what he will bring to the table.

That is, unless...

a) Umpires bring the LeBron Rule to MLB, and start giving him superstar strike calls on pitches off the plate to help appease the hype MLB and the media have placed on him. Greg Maddux, Tom Glavine, Roger Clemens and many other stars can thank umpires for a few hundred extra career strikeouts netted in part from marginally wider star pitcher strike zones.

b) He gets hurt. Mark Prior, Kerry Wood, Jake Peavy, Ben Sheets... many a phenom came out of the gates fast only to stumble headlong into obscurity once the injuries piled up. We have no assurance Strasburg will remain healthy and sharp even if the Nats are careful about deploying him.

Or...

c) He gets hit in one or more of his next three starts, which should in itself bring expectations back to Earth. (I'm not expecting it, though)

Anyway, I wouldn't pencil in Strasburg for 470 strikeouts a year. Or even 300. Let's see him strike out a few lineups with guys like Chase Utley and Manny Ramirez first... or at least a few lineups with better hitters than Andrew McCutchen and Garrett Jones.

In all likelihood, however, he's never going to be as good as he was last night, not over 32-34 starts a season. Analysts certainly wouldn't expect that, but a lot of casual fans might. And they're in for a letdown, even if Strasburg goes on to a Hall of Fame career.

Also, check out the Net Runs data for Strasburg's debut.

Should Ryan Howard be more aggressive?

Pat Andriola postulated that Ryan Howard's not helping himself by putting more balls in play as he gets older, leaning back on the Moneyball adage that sluggers should try to take more walks as they age. Howard instead had cut down on his high K rate and his walk rate by being more aggressive.

A brief look at his swing rates: With pitchers pitching around him more than ever (the 42.4% pitches thrown in the zone are the lowest rate he's seen in his career), Howard is swinging at more balls out of the zone (32.6%, up from his usual 25-27%) even though he's swinging at nearly 9% fewer balls in the zone, and is by a hair running the highest contact rate (69.7%) of his career. It's not a drastic move on his part, but Howard is to some extent being more aggressive at the plate despite pitchers pitching around him more than ever.

There are various ways to look at the issue. Howard is slow so while he could draw more walks he'd clog up the basepaths when he does, hindering the efforts of hitters behind him in the order. On the flip side, by swinging more he's generating more outs, even if he might generate more power.

But let's focus on the numbers. I decided to use his batted ball rates to estimate a difference between his current approach and his previous approach, and then estimate numbers based on the suggested approach (be patient, take more walks) to compare.

So let's take his current averages on balls in play and estimate how he would do. Howard's career numbers by BIP:

GB: .205 AVG, .209 SLG
FB: .417 AVG, 1.382 SLG
LD ISO: .338

For his line drives, we'll use his isolated power to determine his LD slugging but use a static .732 average for LD since LD averages tend to fall in the same range regardless of player.

Now this season he has seen a noticeable decline in his power. His isolated power on flyballs, at .965 over his career, has dipped sharply to .560. His 2010 numbers:

GB: .257 AVG, .257 SLG
FB: .240 AVG, .800 SLG
LD ISO: .235

Now, GB rates tend to be consistent for a player over his career as footspeed is a big factor. So for this projection I'll use his career AVG/SLG of .205 and .209. I expect his current .257 AVG will regress over time. I'll use his 2010 FB rates as those are largely determined by power and ability, and for his LD rates I'll again use the standard .732 AVG and tack on his revised ISO for 2010 to get a LD slugging of .967.

So here are the batted ball averages I'll use as we continue:

GB: .205 AVG, .209 SLG
FB: .240 AVG, .800 SLG
LD: .732 AVG, .967 SLG

Let's take these revised averages and apply them along with his career walk, strikeout and batted ball rates over 500 hypothetical plate appearances to estimate how this new and dis-improved Ryan Howard would hit if he didn't change a thing:

Walk: 12.6%
Strikeout: 32.2%
GB %: 39.1%
LD %: 23.2%
FB %: 37.7%

AB: 439
H: 94
TB: 169
BB: 63
K: 161
AVG/OBP/SLG... OPS: .214/.314/.385... .699

Yeah, that's the look of a player that's done. So can't blame Ryan Howard for trying to change his game.

Now, let's take his current batted ball rates and his current walk and K rates to estimate how he'd do over 500 hypothetical PAs.

Walk: 7.6%
Strikeout: 25.6%
GB %: 43.5%
LD %: 22.1%
FB %: 34.4%

AB: 462
H: 111
TB: 194
BB: 38
K: 128
AVG/OBP/SLG... OPS: .240/.298/.420... .718

Still not good, but better than he would do otherwise. He'd get on base less, but he'd hit for higher average (on average) and he'd hit for more power.

However, we should also estimate how he'd do with the advised approach, taking more pitches and trying to draw more walks. To estimate his walk and K rates, we thankfully have a relatively close approximation of a season where he saw a similarly low number of pitches in the zone: His spectacular 2007 season. That year he saw 44.4% of pitches hit the zone, and in that season he drew walks in a career high 16.5% of his PAs. However, he also whiffed a career high 37.6% of the time.

Let's make some assumptions: Given he's watching 57.6% of pitches miss the zone, if he were to take pitches accordingly he could almost match that 16% walk rate. He's going to K a lot, but his eye has improved from 2007 and his K rate will be a bit lower... more like 35%. He's still going to strike out a lot as age erodes his already limited ability to recognize and make contact with pitches in the zone, and as he takes more pitches to try and work more walks and/or wait for pitches to hit.

Let's assume his current batted ball rates will match his batted ball rates going forward and estimate a line over 500 hypothetical PAs.

Walk: 16.0%
Strikeout: 35.0%
GB %: 43.5%
LD %: 22.1%
FB %: 34.4%

AB: 420
H: 82
TB: 142
BB: 80
K: 175
AVG/OBP/SLG... OPS: .195/.324/.338... .662

Ewwwwwwww. If Ryan Howard were to take the suggested approach, he'd draw more walks... at the expense of pretty much everything else, and his collapse would be even MORE pronounced than had he done nothing.

So maybe, by electing to get more aggressive, Ryan Howard is on to something. All that aside, he is in a loaded lineup full of great players, and he's going to drive more of them in by hitting the ball than by drawing free passes, and I go back to the first point about his slowness clogging up the basepaths and limiting the hitters behind him when he does take walks. And most of all, he just signed a ridiculous $125 million extension, and they're not paying him to draw 80 walks. They're paying him to swing the bat and drive in his teammates.

But the averages themselves show that the suggested approach of patience, whether it worked for David Justice in a bygone era or not, would not work for Ryan Howard. It would kill his career faster than he would by staying the course and waiting for collapse. His increased aggression may not get him on base as much, but it's probably going to extend his career a couple years longer...

... assuming, of course, that this is a permanent adjustment and not just the product of random noise from his first two months of the season. But if and when he needs to adjust, history indicates he's better served playing to his strengths as a power hitter and focusing on hitting the ball, rather than playing to his weaknesses and trying to work ball four before taking strike three, and clogging the basepaths.

How To Shake Up a Losing Team

Right now, the biggest endemic problem behind the Mariners' continued futility (aside obviously from bad fortune and a relative lack of talent) is Don Wakamatsu's insistence on affixing and entitling players to roles.

Last year, a big part of the team's success lied behind Wak's constant reshuffling and tinkering of the existing roster, hitting, pitching and playing nearly everyone in different lineup spots, different bullpen situations, different substitution roles, different lots of things, unless guys showed a consistent demonstrated in-season ability to produce at a given spot. History and track records were largely ignored.

Save for Griffey in the 5 hole, Wak didn't let a bad hitter hit 2nd or 3rd while leaving a good hitter to either bat 8th or rot on the bench in 2009. He didn't balk at letting slugger Russell Branyan bat 2nd just because he was "not a #2 hitter" or because "he's a middle of the order bat". Save for Ichiro at RF and batting leadoff, Wak mixed and matched a lot of different lineups, often moving guys up if they were hitting well and moving guys down if they weren't.

This year, however, he's insistently batted Chone Figgins 2nd despite weak production, insistently batted Milton Bradley 4th or Griffey 5th despite weak production, insistently batted Josh Wilson 7th-9th despite actual production, and insistently refused to play Ryan Langerhans despite actual production when he has played.

The bullpen is no different. He's insistently turned to Sean White and Brandon League in pressure situations because he doesn't trust the other pitchers... even though he turned to everybody last year without regard to whether he could "trust X pitcher in a pressure situation". That's how short reliever David Aardsma got the chance to establish himself as the closer last year.

******

If Wak wants to help turn this ship around (whether or not it's too late and you could have argued it was weeks ago), he needs to ditch the roles and start mixing up the lineups again. If a guy's hot, hit him higher in the order even if your scouts say the guy blows. Let him prove he blows, and then move him down or bench him in favor of someone else that's hitting hot. Take Langerhans and Saunders off the bench and play them 3-4 times a week... somewhere, ANYWHERE. Let Langerhans start at 1B or LF vs LHPs. Maybe Wak will finally learn that he can hit lefties (psst, Langerhans CAN hit LHPs). Start Griffey in LF and- no, just kidding, let that old man sleep, and wake him if you need a PH in the 9th.

Take your starting lineup and bat the guys based on their numbers. Go ahead and bat Ichiro leadoff. Have the two other highest OPS hitters bat 3rd and 4th. Take the next highest OBP and bat that guy 2nd. Then sort the 5-9 hitters by slugging %. If you want, put the fastest guy or the best remaining OBP at #9. Do this every night even if it means putting someone in a lineup spot he doesn't seem to belong in. What, the guys you're batting 3rd belong there now? Is that how the M's landed dead last in offense?

Here's a sample of what I'd consider an optimal hitting lineup given stats as of 5-31-2010. Langerhans would, as he's done a few times this year, play 1B, Sweeney would DH and Bradley would play LF. You could mix/match that around and have Bradley DH, Sweeney play 1B and Langerhans play LF if you'd like.

Ichiro 9
Guti 8
Bard 2
Langerhans 3
Sweeney 0
Wilson 6
Bradley 7
Lopez 5
Figgins 4

Here would be the optimal lineup that benches Milton Bradley, which may not be in the team's best interests as despite his numbers he's actually a good hitter, but is true to the hitting numbers as his are among the team's lowest:

Ichiro 9
Guti 8
Bard 2
Langerhans 3
Sweeney 0
Saunders 7
Wilson 6
Lopez 5
Figgins 4

The bullpen: Wak ought to put the relievers on a rotation and use them regularly regardless of the situation. Put Shawn Kelley in that pressure situation. Pitch Sean White in the 7th even if we're up 6 or down 7. Go ahead and bring Aardsma in for the 9th in a tie game or if we're down one.

This is admittedly an idealist proposal: There's no way Wak's getting away from the closer role. In any case, I'd ideally keep a loose rotation of three tandems of relievers (one durable middle man and one short reliever), with each day's designated tandem working in relief of the starter after he faced 27 batters (the entire order three times).

The middle men would be more durable and expected to work multiple innings to bridge the gap between the starter and short reliever, while the short man would be expected to get the last 2-4 outs. Each tandem first lists the long/middle man, then the short man.

Tandem 1: Sean White, David Aardsma
Tandem 2: Garrett Olson, Shawn Kelley
Tandem 3: Ryan Rowland-Smith, Brandon League

This is from the existing pool of six Mariners relievers and is balanced out: White is probably the best of the three middle men and he is paired with the most unreliable of the short men, which ironically is the current closer Aardsma. Kelley and League just happen to be more reliable short men than Aardsma. Likewise, RRS is probably the least reliable of the long/middle men and gets paired with the more reliable short man Brandon League.

This would not be a firm rotation: Sometimes the starter goes the distance, some relievers may recover quicker than others, and adverse situations (like the starter getting destroyed and leaving the bullpen 5-7 innings of relief) may require burning more than two relievers. But given the starters are mostly working deep into games, 6-8 innings, it's not too much to try and stick to a rotation where relievers would be assured of work every 3 games, with 2-3 days of rest between outing. And of course, guys can improve or devolve, and a guy lower on the chain may prove to be more reliable than originally thought, and vice versa.

Tandem One goes on day one, T2 on day 2, T3 on day 3 and then back to T1 on day 4 and so on. And yes, you send them out there in their given order no matter what the score is. If Aardsma enters with a 10-1 lead, whatever. If Shawn Kelley inherits a save situation, so be it. Once the starter faces the lineup three full times, yank him and put in the middle reliever.

Have the middle reliever get to the 9th, whether that takes 2 pitches or four innings (all three middle men have starting experience and can easily stretch out to handle that sort of workload). At least have the middle man face the lineup a full time (9 batters), then put in the short guy to finish. This should work fine at least 90% of the time given this defense, the rotation and the home park. Rarely should the short man come in with 3-4 innings left (if he does, it's because someone got hurt or you're getting annihilated). If that's the case, burn another reliever depending on rest and whatever else and reorganize as need be.

If you have to jack around with the system and overuse guys, just make sure everyone gets as much rest as you can get them. At this point in a lost season it's not so much about winning as it is about getting guys regular work and making sure they stay as fresh as possible over the entire season.

But it's in the Mariners best interests at this point to get away from roles like the "8th inning fireman" and "#2 hitter" and "#8 hitter", because the roles obviously haven't helped this 19-31 team win. What's the worst that can happen if you do? They keep losing? Well, maybe if they do we'll at least learn something new about these players (maybe even something useful) if you get them out of the comfort zones you've insisted on maintaining despite those comfort zones landing you 11 games under .500 in 2010.

Seattle Mariners minor league EMERA for May 2010

I briefly touched upon the concept a while back, but I now have numbers to go with it.

EMERA, which is short for Expected MLB Earned Run Average, is the ERA you would expect a given minor league pitcher to run over a full season in his present state if he were immediately called up to the Majors.

Once again, here is an average EMERA for the level each of the four full-season minor league affiliates play at. I used only players who had a minimum of ten innings pitched at a given level to make sure I had a decent sample.

Tacoma: 6.36
West Tenn: 7.30
High Desert: 12.80
Clinton: 13.13

Basically, if you have an EMERA equal to one of the above totals, your performance is equivalent to an average pitcher at that level.

If a pitcher runs an EMERA appearing similar to the ERA of a typical MLB pitcher, this indicates the pitcher in question, based on his performance, could pitch in the Majors right now. Obviously, a lot of other variables are at play and the number is based purely on 2010 pitching performances at the given level. So I'm not about to consider these numbers definitive. But they are a helpful guide to how well the pitchers are doing at their given level.

For pitchers who have pitched at multiple levels, all numbers are based on the level at which the player pitched the most. For example, Steve Bray's number is based on his AA numbers while the handful of innings he threw in AAA are ignored.

I broke the pitchers down by tiers of 12. If you were to completely ignore development schedules and plans, you could slot these pitchers by their given tier: Tier one would be your AAA pitchers, tier two would be AA, tier three High A and tier four low A. That in itself can provide a guide to how these pitchers have done: If a single A pitcher is in tier one or two, he's having a good year, and a AAA pitcher in tier three or four is not.

Tier One	Lvl	EMERA
Brian Sweeney	AAA	4.25
Michael Pineda	AA	4.47
Maikel Cleto	A+	4.63
Edward Paredes	AA	4.72
Steven Hensley	AA	5.48
Garrett Olson	AAA	5.54
Mauricio Robles	AA	5.54
Aaron Jensen	AA	5.65
Robert Rohrbaugh	AA	5.78
Anthony Varvaro	AA	5.84
Anthony Vasquez	A	6.26
Steven Richard	A+	6.50

Tier Two	Lvl	EMERA
Dan Cortes	AA	6.55
Steve Bray	AA	6.57
Ryan Feierabend	A+	6.64
Luis Muñoz	AA	6.67
Stephen Penney	A+	6.94
Chad Cordero	AAA	6.96
Josh Fields	AA	7.26
Andrew Carraway	A+	7.27
Chris Kirkland	A	7.33
Brian Moran	A	7.39
Taylor Stanton	A	7.50
Chris Seddon	AAA	7.53

Tier Three	Lvl	EMERA
David Pauley	AAA	7.57
Luke French	AAA	7.68
Levale Speigner	AAA	7.69
Jacob Wild	A+	7.86
Steven Shell	AAA	8.02
John Housey	A	8.05
Andy Baldwin	AAA	8.14
Mike Koplove	AAA	8.18
Brandon Josselyn	A	8.28
Jonathan Hesketh	A	8.45
Cheyne Hann	A+	8.70
Mumba Rivera	AA	8.75

Tier Four	Lvl	EMERA
Bobby LaFromboise	A+	9.04
Erasmo Ramirez	A	9.21
James Gilheeney	A	9.36
Blake Nation	A+	9.44
Kenn Kasparek	A+	9.58
Taylor Lewis	A	9.63
Jose Jimenez	A	10.43
Marwin Vega	A+	11.16
Daniel Cooper	A	11.35
Ryan Moorer	A+	12.75
Tyler Blandford	A	17.33