Saturday, February 23, 2019
There is only one way to rebuild Chicago State basketball
You will not find a more hopeless program in D1 college basketball than Chicago State. A flat broke university that the State of Illinois seriously considered closing a couple years ago, there's no money, no boosters, and they're forced to play in the D1 wasteland conference that is the WAC, requiring a brutally long road trip for all of their games.
No one in D1 wants to play them unless it's a Power 6 program that needs an easy early-season blowout.
Lance Irvin last offseason took a men's head coaching job that no one wanted, and regardless of his ability to recruit or coach he's not going to get much mileage out of a 2-star group of cast-offs and walk-ons. They're not going to outplay programs who have more talent, more resources, let alone any program that has better coaching. They're not going to out-recruit kids against D1 programs who all have a lot more to offer than Chicago State in every category other than playing time.
So what can Irvin (or any coach that comes after him) do to move this program forward?
There is honestly only one way, one that need only requires effort and repetition.
They've got to play absolutely relentless full court man to man defense, every single possession. On offense, they've got to grind the clock with a basic motion passing game (it doesn't have to be the Princeton offense, but if they could learn it that would work), take open inside looks whenever they get them, and otherwise take good open shots near the end of the shot clock.
Teams don't play full court man to man defense correctly. They typically play it as a press, where you close out players in the backcourt, except then a) they try and press the ballhandler to the sidelines, instead of just playing him close and making him work around that defender, plus 2) defenders back off as soon as the ballhandler gets around the first guy, and let the offense freely advance over the timeline.
It's one thing to close a guy out, to quickly step to a ballhandler's face and defend him close. But your hands and footwork once you're there, the second part, is often forgotten.
An astute ballhandler, if they can't pass out of the close, will immediately try and go around the defender. Most guards are quick and can easily outrun defensive positioning... unless the defender knows how to Bounce and Reach.
Bounce and Reach is the process of stepping back (bounce), then stepping back into (and as necessary disrupting) the defender's path (reach). Done right, this provides the defende a controlled way of staying in front of his man, much more so than the more typical recovery-chase after a driving or advancing ballhandler. You typically should even do it when the ballhandler is stationary or otherwise not advancing with the dribble, re-positioning yourself so the defender lacks a convenient dribbling path around the defender.
This allows you to tightly defend ballhandlers in the backcourt as well as the frontcourt. A key reason full court ball-defenders give up and run back once the guards dribble around is because, whether or not they closed out well, they lack knowledge or ability to bounce and reach. They have no personal Plan B once the ballhandler drives or otherwise dribbles past them, and it's up to help defense to save them.
Also, a key reason coaches shy away from close outs in general is because many modern coaches now teach their players to counter a close-out in the half court by driving around it. This is smart for the above reasons: A ball defender who closes out without any plan B is simply beaten unless his pure athleticism allows him to stay ahead.
Here's the thing with close-outs in the full court: Few ballhandlers will drive the rim from 50-90 feet away. Even if they do, even if they can beat the ball defender, the rest of the defense can step up and help as needed to switch and close out themselves.
And, of course, most players closed out in the backcourt will seek to pass out of it. Then you close out the recipient of the pass (which is easy, because the target can't move while the ball's in the air), and repeat the process. If a potential steal is there, you do what you can to take it. Otherwise, close out the receiver and they once again have to work around it.
You can effectively create an obstacle course of tight defense in the backcourt simply by closing out, then bouncing and reaching to maintain position as long as possible until the ballhandler passes out of it or otherwise escapes.
And, even if they get the ball across the timeline before 10 seconds, you continue closing out, continue bouncing and reaching, and just make the offense work as much as possible to set up and run their offense.
This takes only effort and solid footwork. There's no need to reach in. Keep your hands up and back, and simply look to deny or contest a shot. Because of the effort the offense will require, steals will often create themselves since teams have to play perfectly to work around this kind of defense, and teams won't.
On offense, you need not hustle as hard, but guys off the ball should constantly move and cut to the ball. Ballhandlers should look to make a quick pass or take an open shot in lieu of dribbling. If in doubt, position the offense in more of a 5 out (everyone working from the perimeter), and work from there. Inside scoring opportunities should come from open cuts and drives, rather than posting up and dumping it in. If all you've got are outside looks, spot up and take a three, or if a shooter consistently cans midrange jumpers take that. But make the defense move and shift and adjust. And if they sit back in the paint, take open threes and seek to kill them like that until they come out to meet you.
Don't complicate it beyond that. You already aren't going to outcoach most teams, or recruit better talent. So just grind them up. Make their 40 minutes miserable.
This is probably Chicago State's only plausible path to relevance. I don't know if Lance Irvin is the guy to get them there. But either way this is worth a shot.
Saturday, February 9, 2019
The Running Pirates: Out of the Park Baseball, and How I Like To Do It
I play me some Out of the Park Baseball (OOTP), and in my current version I took over the 2017 Pittsburgh Pirates, a middling team lacking direction and at a competitive crossroads.
I've now gotten used to building teams in OOTP around my aggressive running, defense-oriented style, dealing away expensive vets and bringing in lower cost, shorter term guys that fit my mold while acquiring and developing prospects who do the same.
Sure enough I've quickly turned the Pirates into a dangerous 100 win team with a low payroll.
Here's my strategy:
Hitting, or more specifically, Baserunning:
- When there's a man on 1st, we're run + hitting almost every time. Basically, we're stealing as long as the runner has an above average ability to steal bases (which on my team he usually does).
- When there's men on 1st/2nd, and the runner on 2nd is a good base stealer, we're double stealing almost every time regardless of the ability of the trailing runner. It usually works and even the lead-footingest runners get about 5-10 steals a year on my team because of this.
- We don't ever hit and run, but we do run and hit: Here, the runner looks to steal on a pitch and gives the hitter discretion on whether or not to swing.
- On a 0-ball count, the runner is given a straight steal sign instead of the run and hit.
- On a 1-0, 2-0, 2-1, or any 3-ball count, we run and hit. A pitchout on any of these counts may doom the runner but will give us a very good count or another baserunner.
- The Run and Hit is used in other counts at my discretion. Often, we just do it anyway and it just usually works.
- Unless he's a top hitter, the slowest runner in the lineup bats in front of the pitcher. This way, if he gets on with fewer than two outs, the pitcher can bunt him over.
The only times we won't aggressively steal:
- Our only runner is on 1st and either a pitcher or not a good runner.
- We're ahead by a lot late in the game and there's little value to padding the lead.
- The opposing catcher has a very good arm and we only have one baserunner.
- We realize we give away many baserunners caught stealing, and we run ourselves out of some innings. The number of steals and extra runs we produce running this aggressively is considered worth the collateral damage. My team scores about 5-6 runs a game, so if your metrics say we're costing ourselves runs... Scoreboard.
- On a base hit with a runner rounding 3rd and the ball in the OF, we almost always send the runner home instead of holding him at 3rd regardless of the quality of the outfielder's arm. Even with a below average runner, we usually score. The runner has to be incredibly slow and/or the outfielder has to have a laser cannon of an arm for us to consider holding the runner at 3rd.
Defense:
- Every fielder must be rated average or better at his position. Typically we expect at least 55 defense on a 20-80 scale for a regular.
- Defensively, we shift every pull hitter. In DP situations, the infield plays regular DP depth but the outfield shifts, and we will hold the runner if he's a steal threat.
- We'll shift but guard 3B vs a LH pull hitter who can bunt.
- Even against a normal hitter, we usually weak-shift the infield to the hitter's pull side.
- We sub in defensive improvements in the final 1-3 innings, depending on the hitting prowess of the fielder to be subbed out.
- If we're about to pull a pitcher and he comes up to bat with 2 outs and the bases empty in the mid/late innings of a tight game, we'll let him bat and punt the PA rather than wasting a potentially valuable pinch hitter in a spot with a 0.1 run expectancy, especially if his reliever will be expected to work multiple innings. (P.S. Those of you who support the DH in the NL... I honestly wouldn't mind it in these situations)
Pitching:
- Pitchers must have average or better scouted control. Keeping walks low is our top pitching priority.
- Our pitchers never intentionally walk anyone.
- Absolutely no fastballs to a pitcher batting with a runner on 1st, unless he has two strikes and will likely swing away. Don't make it easy for him to bunt. Breaking and offspeed pitches are harder to get down.
- The starting pitcher's goal is to get through the lineup 3 times. Our rule is to pull the SP after a max of 110 pitches or 27 batters, whichever comes first. He may face another 1-2 batters beyond that on an incidental basis. If tired but he has 2 outs and we think he can get out of the inning, we may let him try to finish the inning.
- We have a 6 man rotation... sort of. We have one swingman who is a technically a 6th starter but is used as a reliever when it's clear he won't be needed during the current rotation turn (which is usually). This can be a great spot for a young pitcher with good stuff who struggles with his control, or struggles to get through a lineup more than twice.
- We may also do the same relief deal for the 5th starter if we have days off and can skip the 5th slot in a rotation turn.
- The rotation does not follow a strict order. SPs are sorted based on their performance with the highest rested starter going next. This usually keeps the pitchers in a particular order, but pitchers can leapfrog one another in the order depending on how they pitch, rest, and days off.
- We technically have a 6 man bullpen, but with our use of the back end starters as swing-relievers, it's more like 7-8. Generally, we like to have 4 relievers who can work longer and 2 shorter relievers who could setup or pass for closers on most teams. Ideally, several of our relievers have the stamina to be starters or are former starters.
- Our bullpen is purely by committee. No one has a sole dedicated role, or can solely expect to pitch in particular innings or situations. We may use short men in middle innings if it makes sense, or a longer-reliever to close a game. That said, shorter relief guys generally get the conventional 3 out saves, and longer guys work longer, middle relief or mop up situations.
- We avoid pitching relievers when they're tired or have thrown back to back games. In a fireman situation, if we feel he's well-suited to get 1-2 crucial outs, we may go ahead and throw him there. Usually, these pitchers rest.
We vulture saves whenever possible:
- If ahead by a lot, we'll put in a longer reliever after 6 innings and ask him to finish the last 3 innings for the long save.
- If a reliever enters in the 7th-8th with a 1-3 run lead and we pull ahead by 4+, we'll ask the reliever to finish the game for the save.
- This save-padding is largely to add morale and value for future contracts or trades. GM's and agents tend not to be bright about counting stats like this.
- If a long man's attempting a long save but the game gets back into a 1-3 run save situation, we'll sub in a conventional short reliever for a conventional save.
- When possible we try and get multiple innings out of relievers. The only time we make a mid-inning pitching change is if a pitcher runs out of gas or is otherwise struggling. We deploy for matchups on an inning-to-inning due-up basis, not a batter-to-batter basis.
- We double switch liberally. We try and place the pitcher in the slot that just batted or close to it, if we can sub in a decent player at that position in the prior pitcher's slot.
Personnel:
- Once I took over we quickly dealt anyone who is older, not a particularly good fielder, or expensive over a long term... never minding the expense of short term damage to player morale or fan interest. I took a bath of fire trading Andrew McCutchen and his crappy defense ASAP to the Cubs for Javy Baez and prospects. We actually made that trade during a series at Wrigley! "Happy trails, Cutch. Your new team is down the hall. Tell Javy he can come over when he's ready."
- With trades we seek to add either add unproven potential MLB regulars, pricier quality veteran discards (the Cubs offered Javy when we shopped Cutch, so the AI was looking to trade him), or prospects that display upside plus qualities we value: Control and stamina for pitchers, or speed, defense, contact and plate discipline for hitters.
- We generally trade by shopping a player and seeing who is offered, rather than reaching out to try and land a specific player. We'll then seek to add opposing players of value to an established trade proposal where applicable.
- We'll generally look to quickly deal (or add to a deal) any prospects of value who are unhappy, or who don't appear to have long term potential with the organization (whether they're blocked, they're not good fielders or have other substantial shortcomings that inhibit their role on our MLB team).
- We don't try to fill all 40 spots on the 40 man roster right away. We leave 5-10 spots open at the start of the year to provide the freedom to add desired callups or optionable acquisitions.
- We draft by talent early and by tools late. We often end up picking a lot of hitters in early rounds and a lot of pitchers in later rounds.
- We don't mind picking multiple guys in the Rule 5 any more than we mind skipping it. The team I currently have is pretty much what I want but in a rebuild situation I'll often try and get a bullpen arm, maybe a useful bench player.
Minors:
- Every affiliate should have 14+ batters and 13+ pitchers. Ideally a team has 14-15 available pitchers. I don't mind overloading a team in the short run, but eventually I want upside guys or productive players playing regularly.
- Every MiLB manager is ordered to not intentionally walk or pitch around hitters, to avoid bunting, and not to hit and run. Each given hitter should steal or not steal based on his ability. Managers are usually advised to set lineups in order from the top performing hitters on top to the weakest performing hitters at the bottom. We don't care if the leadoff guy can't steal or if the middle of the order doesn't hit dingers. We mostly care if guys consistently hit and field well.
- The only hitters who are allowed to bunt are hitters who have struggled through 100+ PA, and only according to his skill at bunting. Hitters who are weak at bunting will never be asked to bunt.
- Any hitter or pitcher who is even mildly injured is benched until healed.
- While we seek to play prospects regularly, we spread playing time across the board to start the year and try to regularly play hitters who perform the best at a given level.
- Defensive subs are often used starting in the 7th inning with a lead. This not only helps the relief corps, but allows for a possible PA for the subs since these players aren't getting regular starts.
- Ideally, every player gets 1-2 early season starts at every position he has demonstrated an ability to play.
- We mostly worry about positional fit once a player gets to the AAA level. Either way, if there's no long-term potential MLB fit, we look to deal him.
- Similarly, after our top SPs at each level make 2-3 early season starts, we'll move them to the bullpen and use lesser-used relievers as extended 'openers' for a couple weeks to get everyone some extended work, and help preserve the starters. After every pitcher on the staff has logged about 10 innings, we slot starting pitchers based on performance. The best pitchers start. The next best pitchers are asked to setup and close. Those who don't do well as starters work out of the bullpen. Some top relievers may continue to get used as openers, and over time may stretch out into full time starters.
- Any pitcher who is tired is shelved until he is fully rested. This spreads out the workload to other relievers.
- Even if a player is best suited for short season A ball, we may start his season in full season A ball to keep him active and get him some work if his tools indicate he can handle it, or the A ball teams have a need he can fulfill in the short run. Unless he performs well, he'll be sent back to short season ball once those seasons begin.
- Unhappy players who have no trade value or organizational upside are released.
- When making MLB trades, we sometimes look to have other teams throw in quality non-prospects if they meet a particular affiliate's needs, allow for better placement of other org players at that position (if everyone in the org is playing above their ideal level due to affiliate needs and talent limitations), or have other MLB-level upside that isn't seen by that org or scouts.
- If a player reaches an age older than most others at a given level, and he's not performing at his given level, we may release him rather than send him down, unless he can be traded or can be suitably added to a trade.
Would I recommend this approach?
It's fun, but do whatever you want.
I've now gotten used to building teams in OOTP around my aggressive running, defense-oriented style, dealing away expensive vets and bringing in lower cost, shorter term guys that fit my mold while acquiring and developing prospects who do the same.
Sure enough I've quickly turned the Pirates into a dangerous 100 win team with a low payroll.
Here's my strategy:
Hitting, or more specifically, Baserunning:
- When there's a man on 1st, we're run + hitting almost every time. Basically, we're stealing as long as the runner has an above average ability to steal bases (which on my team he usually does).
- When there's men on 1st/2nd, and the runner on 2nd is a good base stealer, we're double stealing almost every time regardless of the ability of the trailing runner. It usually works and even the lead-footingest runners get about 5-10 steals a year on my team because of this.
- We don't ever hit and run, but we do run and hit: Here, the runner looks to steal on a pitch and gives the hitter discretion on whether or not to swing.
- On a 0-ball count, the runner is given a straight steal sign instead of the run and hit.
- On a 1-0, 2-0, 2-1, or any 3-ball count, we run and hit. A pitchout on any of these counts may doom the runner but will give us a very good count or another baserunner.
- The Run and Hit is used in other counts at my discretion. Often, we just do it anyway and it just usually works.
- Unless he's a top hitter, the slowest runner in the lineup bats in front of the pitcher. This way, if he gets on with fewer than two outs, the pitcher can bunt him over.
The only times we won't aggressively steal:
- Our only runner is on 1st and either a pitcher or not a good runner.
- We're ahead by a lot late in the game and there's little value to padding the lead.
- The opposing catcher has a very good arm and we only have one baserunner.
- We realize we give away many baserunners caught stealing, and we run ourselves out of some innings. The number of steals and extra runs we produce running this aggressively is considered worth the collateral damage. My team scores about 5-6 runs a game, so if your metrics say we're costing ourselves runs... Scoreboard.
- On a base hit with a runner rounding 3rd and the ball in the OF, we almost always send the runner home instead of holding him at 3rd regardless of the quality of the outfielder's arm. Even with a below average runner, we usually score. The runner has to be incredibly slow and/or the outfielder has to have a laser cannon of an arm for us to consider holding the runner at 3rd.
Defense:
- Every fielder must be rated average or better at his position. Typically we expect at least 55 defense on a 20-80 scale for a regular.
- Defensively, we shift every pull hitter. In DP situations, the infield plays regular DP depth but the outfield shifts, and we will hold the runner if he's a steal threat.
- We'll shift but guard 3B vs a LH pull hitter who can bunt.
- Even against a normal hitter, we usually weak-shift the infield to the hitter's pull side.
- We sub in defensive improvements in the final 1-3 innings, depending on the hitting prowess of the fielder to be subbed out.
- If we're about to pull a pitcher and he comes up to bat with 2 outs and the bases empty in the mid/late innings of a tight game, we'll let him bat and punt the PA rather than wasting a potentially valuable pinch hitter in a spot with a 0.1 run expectancy, especially if his reliever will be expected to work multiple innings. (P.S. Those of you who support the DH in the NL... I honestly wouldn't mind it in these situations)
Pitching:
- Pitchers must have average or better scouted control. Keeping walks low is our top pitching priority.
- Our pitchers never intentionally walk anyone.
- Absolutely no fastballs to a pitcher batting with a runner on 1st, unless he has two strikes and will likely swing away. Don't make it easy for him to bunt. Breaking and offspeed pitches are harder to get down.
- The starting pitcher's goal is to get through the lineup 3 times. Our rule is to pull the SP after a max of 110 pitches or 27 batters, whichever comes first. He may face another 1-2 batters beyond that on an incidental basis. If tired but he has 2 outs and we think he can get out of the inning, we may let him try to finish the inning.
- We have a 6 man rotation... sort of. We have one swingman who is a technically a 6th starter but is used as a reliever when it's clear he won't be needed during the current rotation turn (which is usually). This can be a great spot for a young pitcher with good stuff who struggles with his control, or struggles to get through a lineup more than twice.
- We may also do the same relief deal for the 5th starter if we have days off and can skip the 5th slot in a rotation turn.
- The rotation does not follow a strict order. SPs are sorted based on their performance with the highest rested starter going next. This usually keeps the pitchers in a particular order, but pitchers can leapfrog one another in the order depending on how they pitch, rest, and days off.
- We technically have a 6 man bullpen, but with our use of the back end starters as swing-relievers, it's more like 7-8. Generally, we like to have 4 relievers who can work longer and 2 shorter relievers who could setup or pass for closers on most teams. Ideally, several of our relievers have the stamina to be starters or are former starters.
- Our bullpen is purely by committee. No one has a sole dedicated role, or can solely expect to pitch in particular innings or situations. We may use short men in middle innings if it makes sense, or a longer-reliever to close a game. That said, shorter relief guys generally get the conventional 3 out saves, and longer guys work longer, middle relief or mop up situations.
- We avoid pitching relievers when they're tired or have thrown back to back games. In a fireman situation, if we feel he's well-suited to get 1-2 crucial outs, we may go ahead and throw him there. Usually, these pitchers rest.
We vulture saves whenever possible:
- If ahead by a lot, we'll put in a longer reliever after 6 innings and ask him to finish the last 3 innings for the long save.
- If a reliever enters in the 7th-8th with a 1-3 run lead and we pull ahead by 4+, we'll ask the reliever to finish the game for the save.
- This save-padding is largely to add morale and value for future contracts or trades. GM's and agents tend not to be bright about counting stats like this.
- If a long man's attempting a long save but the game gets back into a 1-3 run save situation, we'll sub in a conventional short reliever for a conventional save.
- When possible we try and get multiple innings out of relievers. The only time we make a mid-inning pitching change is if a pitcher runs out of gas or is otherwise struggling. We deploy for matchups on an inning-to-inning due-up basis, not a batter-to-batter basis.
- We double switch liberally. We try and place the pitcher in the slot that just batted or close to it, if we can sub in a decent player at that position in the prior pitcher's slot.
Personnel:
- Once I took over we quickly dealt anyone who is older, not a particularly good fielder, or expensive over a long term... never minding the expense of short term damage to player morale or fan interest. I took a bath of fire trading Andrew McCutchen and his crappy defense ASAP to the Cubs for Javy Baez and prospects. We actually made that trade during a series at Wrigley! "Happy trails, Cutch. Your new team is down the hall. Tell Javy he can come over when he's ready."
- With trades we seek to add either add unproven potential MLB regulars, pricier quality veteran discards (the Cubs offered Javy when we shopped Cutch, so the AI was looking to trade him), or prospects that display upside plus qualities we value: Control and stamina for pitchers, or speed, defense, contact and plate discipline for hitters.
- We generally trade by shopping a player and seeing who is offered, rather than reaching out to try and land a specific player. We'll then seek to add opposing players of value to an established trade proposal where applicable.
- We'll generally look to quickly deal (or add to a deal) any prospects of value who are unhappy, or who don't appear to have long term potential with the organization (whether they're blocked, they're not good fielders or have other substantial shortcomings that inhibit their role on our MLB team).
- We don't try to fill all 40 spots on the 40 man roster right away. We leave 5-10 spots open at the start of the year to provide the freedom to add desired callups or optionable acquisitions.
- We draft by talent early and by tools late. We often end up picking a lot of hitters in early rounds and a lot of pitchers in later rounds.
- We don't mind picking multiple guys in the Rule 5 any more than we mind skipping it. The team I currently have is pretty much what I want but in a rebuild situation I'll often try and get a bullpen arm, maybe a useful bench player.
Minors:
- Every affiliate should have 14+ batters and 13+ pitchers. Ideally a team has 14-15 available pitchers. I don't mind overloading a team in the short run, but eventually I want upside guys or productive players playing regularly.
- Every MiLB manager is ordered to not intentionally walk or pitch around hitters, to avoid bunting, and not to hit and run. Each given hitter should steal or not steal based on his ability. Managers are usually advised to set lineups in order from the top performing hitters on top to the weakest performing hitters at the bottom. We don't care if the leadoff guy can't steal or if the middle of the order doesn't hit dingers. We mostly care if guys consistently hit and field well.
- The only hitters who are allowed to bunt are hitters who have struggled through 100+ PA, and only according to his skill at bunting. Hitters who are weak at bunting will never be asked to bunt.
- Any hitter or pitcher who is even mildly injured is benched until healed.
- While we seek to play prospects regularly, we spread playing time across the board to start the year and try to regularly play hitters who perform the best at a given level.
- Defensive subs are often used starting in the 7th inning with a lead. This not only helps the relief corps, but allows for a possible PA for the subs since these players aren't getting regular starts.
- Ideally, every player gets 1-2 early season starts at every position he has demonstrated an ability to play.
- We mostly worry about positional fit once a player gets to the AAA level. Either way, if there's no long-term potential MLB fit, we look to deal him.
- Similarly, after our top SPs at each level make 2-3 early season starts, we'll move them to the bullpen and use lesser-used relievers as extended 'openers' for a couple weeks to get everyone some extended work, and help preserve the starters. After every pitcher on the staff has logged about 10 innings, we slot starting pitchers based on performance. The best pitchers start. The next best pitchers are asked to setup and close. Those who don't do well as starters work out of the bullpen. Some top relievers may continue to get used as openers, and over time may stretch out into full time starters.
- Any pitcher who is tired is shelved until he is fully rested. This spreads out the workload to other relievers.
- Even if a player is best suited for short season A ball, we may start his season in full season A ball to keep him active and get him some work if his tools indicate he can handle it, or the A ball teams have a need he can fulfill in the short run. Unless he performs well, he'll be sent back to short season ball once those seasons begin.
- Unhappy players who have no trade value or organizational upside are released.
- When making MLB trades, we sometimes look to have other teams throw in quality non-prospects if they meet a particular affiliate's needs, allow for better placement of other org players at that position (if everyone in the org is playing above their ideal level due to affiliate needs and talent limitations), or have other MLB-level upside that isn't seen by that org or scouts.
- If a player reaches an age older than most others at a given level, and he's not performing at his given level, we may release him rather than send him down, unless he can be traded or can be suitably added to a trade.
Would I recommend this approach?
It's fun, but do whatever you want.
10 Interesting Items To Me About The 2018 MLB League Splits
All data is courtesy of Baseball Reference.
Needless to say, this list of quick thoughts is by no means comprehensive. Do your own digging and research to learn more, and if you think you can contradict me on any opinions, I imagine you're right.
- There's very little substantial difference between age groups in batting average or OBP. The only difference is that slugging about 20 points for hitters older than 30.
- Hitters who swung at the first pitch slugged .442, compared to hitters who didn't at .395. Their OBP improved by 20 points after the 1st pitch but their average dropped 23 points.
- Hitters who took a 1st pitch strike batted 218/264/349. Maybe swinging away at that first pitch is a better idea.
- When teams didn't IBB the hitter with a man on 2nd and 1st base empty, the hitter batted 240/328/390, compared to 241/308/402 with the bases empty.
- With the bases loaded and 2 out, batters hit a paltry 231/296/409, with a run expectancy in that situation of 0.616. Pitchers are probably best off just piping it and hoping for the best.
- High leverage: 249/322/402. Medium leverage: 251/320/414. Low leverage: 245/315/409. The slashes are all basically the same. Perhaps the leverage doesn't matter as much to a hitter's performance as people think.
- Aside from obviously the 1st inning, the highest OPS by inning came in the 4th-6th innings, indicating that tiring starters and long relievers are easier to hit off of. Along with the idea of the opener, perhaps managers would benefit plugging another quality reliever in one or more of the middle innings... or at least pulling struggling starters before the 5th and letting a good reliever bridge the gap. The notion of a pitching staff of 12 power relievers that can consistently work multiple innings doesn't seem too bad.
- Three True Outcomes OPS (out of play HR, walks and strikeouts only) is .836.
- Balls pulled to LF: .416 average, 1.203 OPS. Balls pulled to RF: .326 average, .950 OPS. This may be selective memory, but I believe LH power hitters get shifted a lot more often, because a RHB shift makes it harder for the 1B to cover the bag in time on a grounder. However, LHBs who go opposite field OPS 88 points higher (.784 to .696) than RHBs who go oppo to RF.
- No park saw more walks than Wrigley Field (614), with the next closest being Yankee Stadium at 596 (granted, the Cubs hosted a one game playoff tiebreaker after the season). No park saw fewer than Safeco Field (402), with the next closest (Comerica Park) seeing 443.
Needless to say, this list of quick thoughts is by no means comprehensive. Do your own digging and research to learn more, and if you think you can contradict me on any opinions, I imagine you're right.
- There's very little substantial difference between age groups in batting average or OBP. The only difference is that slugging about 20 points for hitters older than 30.
- Hitters who swung at the first pitch slugged .442, compared to hitters who didn't at .395. Their OBP improved by 20 points after the 1st pitch but their average dropped 23 points.
- Hitters who took a 1st pitch strike batted 218/264/349. Maybe swinging away at that first pitch is a better idea.
- When teams didn't IBB the hitter with a man on 2nd and 1st base empty, the hitter batted 240/328/390, compared to 241/308/402 with the bases empty.
- With the bases loaded and 2 out, batters hit a paltry 231/296/409, with a run expectancy in that situation of 0.616. Pitchers are probably best off just piping it and hoping for the best.
- High leverage: 249/322/402. Medium leverage: 251/320/414. Low leverage: 245/315/409. The slashes are all basically the same. Perhaps the leverage doesn't matter as much to a hitter's performance as people think.
- Aside from obviously the 1st inning, the highest OPS by inning came in the 4th-6th innings, indicating that tiring starters and long relievers are easier to hit off of. Along with the idea of the opener, perhaps managers would benefit plugging another quality reliever in one or more of the middle innings... or at least pulling struggling starters before the 5th and letting a good reliever bridge the gap. The notion of a pitching staff of 12 power relievers that can consistently work multiple innings doesn't seem too bad.
- Three True Outcomes OPS (out of play HR, walks and strikeouts only) is .836.
- Balls pulled to LF: .416 average, 1.203 OPS. Balls pulled to RF: .326 average, .950 OPS. This may be selective memory, but I believe LH power hitters get shifted a lot more often, because a RHB shift makes it harder for the 1B to cover the bag in time on a grounder. However, LHBs who go opposite field OPS 88 points higher (.784 to .696) than RHBs who go oppo to RF.
- No park saw more walks than Wrigley Field (614), with the next closest being Yankee Stadium at 596 (granted, the Cubs hosted a one game playoff tiebreaker after the season). No park saw fewer than Safeco Field (402), with the next closest (Comerica Park) seeing 443.
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