There is only one way to rebuild Chicago State basketball

You will not find a more hopeless program in D1 college basketball than Chicago State. A flat broke university that the State of Illinois seriously considered closing a couple years ago, there's no money, no boosters, and they're forced to play in the D1 wasteland conference that is the WAC, requiring a brutally long road trip for all of their games.

No one in D1 wants to play them unless it's a Power 6 program that needs an easy early-season blowout.

Lance Irvin last offseason took a men's head coaching job that no one wanted, and regardless of his ability to recruit or coach he's not going to get much mileage out of a 2-star group of cast-offs and walk-ons. They're not going to outplay programs who have more talent, more resources, let alone any program that has better coaching. They're not going to out-recruit kids against D1 programs who all have a lot more to offer than Chicago State in every category other than playing time.

So what can Irvin (or any coach that comes after him) do to move this program forward?

There is honestly only one way, one that need only requires effort and repetition.

They've got to play absolutely relentless full court man to man defense, every single possession. On offense, they've got to grind the clock with a basic motion passing game (it doesn't have to be the Princeton offense, but if they could learn it that would work), take open inside looks whenever they get them, and otherwise take good open shots near the end of the shot clock.

Teams don't play full court man to man defense correctly. They typically play it as a press, where you close out players in the backcourt, except then a) they try and press the ballhandler to the sidelines, instead of just playing him close and making him work around that defender, plus 2) defenders back off as soon as the ballhandler gets around the first guy, and let the offense freely advance over the timeline.

It's one thing to close a guy out, to quickly step to a ballhandler's face and defend him close. But your hands and footwork once you're there, the second part, is often forgotten.

An astute ballhandler, if they can't pass out of the close, will immediately try and go around the defender. Most guards are quick and can easily outrun defensive positioning... unless the defender knows how to Bounce and Reach.

Bounce and Reach is the process of stepping back (bounce), then stepping back into (and as necessary disrupting) the defender's path (reach). Done right, this provides the defende a controlled way of staying in front of his man, much more so than the more typical recovery-chase after a driving or advancing ballhandler. You typically should even do it when the ballhandler is stationary or otherwise not advancing with the dribble, re-positioning yourself so the defender lacks a convenient dribbling path around the defender.

This allows you to tightly defend ballhandlers in the backcourt as well as the frontcourt. A key reason full court ball-defenders give up and run back once the guards dribble around is because, whether or not they closed out well, they lack knowledge or ability to bounce and reach. They have no personal Plan B once the ballhandler drives or otherwise dribbles past them, and it's up to help defense to save them.

Also, a key reason coaches shy away from close outs in general is because many modern coaches now teach their players to counter a close-out in the half court by driving around it. This is smart for the above reasons: A ball defender who closes out without any plan B is simply beaten unless his pure athleticism allows him to stay ahead.

Here's the thing with close-outs in the full court: Few ballhandlers will drive the rim from 50-90 feet away. Even if they do, even if they can beat the ball defender, the rest of the defense can step up and help as needed to switch and close out themselves.

And, of course, most players closed out in the backcourt will seek to pass out of it. Then you close out the recipient of the pass (which is easy, because the target can't move while the ball's in the air), and repeat the process. If a potential steal is there, you do what you can to take it. Otherwise, close out the receiver and they once again have to work around it.

You can effectively create an obstacle course of tight defense in the backcourt simply by closing out, then bouncing and reaching to maintain position as long as possible until the ballhandler passes out of it or otherwise escapes.

And, even if they get the ball across the timeline before 10 seconds, you continue closing out, continue bouncing and reaching, and just make the offense work as much as possible to set up and run their offense.

This takes only effort and solid footwork. There's no need to reach in. Keep your hands up and back, and simply look to deny or contest a shot. Because of the effort the offense will require, steals will often create themselves since teams have to play perfectly to work around this kind of defense, and teams won't.

On offense, you need not hustle as hard, but guys off the ball should constantly move and cut to the ball. Ballhandlers should look to make a quick pass or take an open shot in lieu of dribbling. If in doubt, position the offense in more of a 5 out (everyone working from the perimeter), and work from there. Inside scoring opportunities should come from open cuts and drives, rather than posting up and dumping it in. If all you've got are outside looks, spot up and take a three, or if a shooter consistently cans midrange jumpers take that. But make the defense move and shift and adjust. And if they sit back in the paint, take open threes and seek to kill them like that until they come out to meet you.

Don't complicate it beyond that. You already aren't going to outcoach most teams, or recruit better talent. So just grind them up. Make their 40 minutes miserable.

This is probably Chicago State's only plausible path to relevance. I don't know if Lance Irvin is the guy to get them there. But either way this is worth a shot.

Basketball Low Post Essentials

It takes more than being big to play the low post in basketball. The post position requires just as much technique as running the point, playing the perimeter or playing the wing. On offense, low post skill is vital to giving your team a scoring threat inside, plus opening up opportunities for your outside shooters as well as drives to the basket for the guards.

Position matters. On offense, you ideally want to receive the ball at the middle of the edge of the free throw lane. Too far inside and your defender can cut off a good look at the basket, as well as available angles to get the ball inside. Too far outside and your best look will be a long shot, with poor prospects for an offensive rebound if you miss since you're so far from the basket. And of course, if you're in the free throw lane, you can get called for a three second violation.

Your opposing defender typically knows this, and will try to cut you off from your desired position. Beat that defender to the punch and get as close to your ideal spot as possible with a strong stance:

- Feet wide apart to ensure a strong base.
- Butt out to create space between you and the defender.
- Arm up, firm and strong if the defender overplays you to one side to ward him/her off.
- Opposite arm and hand extended in space to give your passer a clear target
- Back straight to maintain leverage when the defender challenges your position.

Solid drills can involve working on any of these aspects individually. But make sure to perfect all of them in practice until they are second nature. They are vital to successful position in the post and, subsequently, successful low post play.

1. Move towards the pass when it comes.
2. Jump stop as you receive the ball, to stop in a strong position.
3. Keep the ball head high with your elbows out. This protects the ball from the defender as you prepare for your next move.

With the ball in hand, look for the defender to either a) overplay you to one side or b) for everyone you see on defense to show weakness or an opening to one side. From here, you can either:

- Pivot and take an open shot
- Pivot and drive to the hoop
- Find an open outside shooter and feed him/her the ball.

Proper technique and positioning while playing the post gives you all these options, and helps you open up the offense as well as your own options. From this fundamentally sound base, you can practice different approaches. Allow yourself to improvise in scrimmages and non-competitive games to discover approaches and strategies that work for you.

Seattle Mariners Net Runs for 4-30-2010 (Texas 2, Seattle 0, 12 innings)

Team	Player	Net Runs	Hit	Pitch	Def	Base	EXERA	PitOuts
TEX	Colby Lewis	3.248	0.000	3.248	0.000	0.000	1.20	27
TEX	Matt Treanor	-0.457	-0.457	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	Justin Smoak	-1.580	-0.960	0.000	-0.620	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	Ian Kinsler	0.122	-0.364	0.000	0.703	-0.217	0.00	0
TEX	Michael Young	0.094	0.335	0.000	-0.241	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	Elvis Andrus	-0.658	-0.178	0.000	-0.480	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	Josh Hamilton	-0.586	-0.749	0.000	0.163	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	Craig Gentry	-0.445	-0.591	0.000	0.146	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	Vladimir Guerrero	0.225	-0.862	0.000	1.087	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	Ryan Garko	-1.148	-1.148	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	TEX Luckbox	2.555	1.324	0.000	1.231	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	Ron Washington	-0.358	0.000	-0.358	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	Julio Borbon	0.588	-0.095	0.000	0.683	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	David Murphy	-0.098	-0.098	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
TEX	Darren Oliver	0.174	0.000	0.174	0.000	0.000	0.00	1
TEX	Darren O'Day	0.093	0.000	0.093	0.000	0.000	3.05	2
TEX	Frank Francisco	0.409	0.000	0.409	0.000	0.000	0.80	3
TEX	Neftali Feliz	-0.178	0.000	-0.178	0.000	0.000	5.70	3

Team	Player	Net Runs	Hit	Pitch	Def	Base	EXERA	PitOuts
SEA	Cliff Lee	0.240	0.000	0.240	0.000	0.000	3.93	21
SEA	Adam Moore	-0.337	-0.337	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Casey Kotchman	-1.130	-1.275	0.000	0.145	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Chone Figgins	1.033	-0.631	0.000	1.664	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Jose Lopez	0.085	0.083	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Jack Wilson	-0.518	-0.792	0.000	0.274	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Milton Bradley	1.802	0.689	0.000	1.113	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Franklin Gutierrez	-0.574	-1.543	0.000	0.969	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Ichiro Suzuki	1.618	1.055	0.000	0.563	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Ken Griffey Jr	-0.297	-0.297	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	SEA Luckbox	0.358	0.358	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Don Wakamatsu	-0.424	0.000	-0.424	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Eric Byrnes	-1.685	-1.685	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Mike Sweeney	-1.685	-1.204	0.000	0.000	-0.481	0.00	0
SEA	Matt Tuiasosopo	-0.481	0.000	0.000	-0.481	0.000	0.00	0
SEA	Mark Lowe	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	4.20	3
SEA	David Aardsma	0.360	0.000	0.360	0.000	0.000	1.21	3
SEA	Brandon League	-0.643	0.000	-0.643	0.000	0.000	6.51	7
SEA	Sean White	0.276	0.000	0.276	0.000	0.000	0.76	2
	Safeco Field	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0

Player of the Game: Colby Lewis (3.248 pitching NRuns)
Gifts from Mariners mistakes: 2.555 NRuns

Putting the 'suicide' in suicide squeeze: -1.685 NRuns

Welcome to the Sweendawghouse: Mike Sweeney (-1.685 NRuns)

Mariners hitting: -5.579 NRuns

Cliff Lee, Chone Figgins, Ichiro and Milton Bradley: 4.693 NRuns
All other Mariners: -6.693 NRuns

******

This game was everything about the 2010 Seattle Mariners in a 12 inning nutshell. They got great pitching and wasted a fine starting pitching performance. They made fine defensive plays. They couldn't score any runs. They made an ordinary starting pitcher look incredible. Ken Griffey Jr and Mike Sweeney made easy outs and showed they have next to nothing left as hitters. Eric Byrnes made people angry. Don Wakamatsu overmanaged and made bad decisions as a result. A reliever took a loss he didn't necessarily deserve. Their opponents did everything to give the game away and the Mariners did them tenfold better to give it right back. We saw Sean White. They kept a winnable game close, but blew every chance they got to take it, and instead found a way to lose it.

Don Wakamatsu only received Net Runs credit for the intentional walk he had Brandon League issue, but if you wanted to give him credit for the bad suicide squeeze call (and given it blew up in part because of bad communication, you could make a case for that), then Wak cost the Mariners 2.109 NRuns, easily the most a manager has cost his team in a single game. As it stands, his total is fairly close to the biggest negative contribution by a manager in a game.

I almost decided to go to this game at Safeco Field tonight. Now I'm glad I didn't.

Addendum on surviving Cliff Lee with 11 pitchers: A Bullpen Plan

To further elaborate on surviving Cliff Lee's loss with six relievers instead of being forced into a bench-shortening 12 man pitching staff, I'll toss out a concrete plan that could work with an eleven man staff.

The key is to be more organized with your bullpen. Let's assume a bullpen of the closer, David Aardsma, two short men in Brandon League and Mark Lowe, and three longer relievers in Shawn Kelley, Sean White and Rule 5 pickup Kanekoa Texeira.

We commonly accept using five starting pitchers in a set rotation. This goes back decades (though farther back they used 3-4 pitchers instead of five). This helps define a timetable for each pitcher, as they know what day they have to throw on and that they will get days off to rest... and sets a mostly definitive workload: They know they will throw up to 100-120 pitches every five days.

Why not use your relievers in a rotation of their own?

The only man that will not work on a schedule is Aardsma. In the traditional closer's role, he will come on to lock down any game with a 1-3 run lead, preferably to start the 9th but sooner if needed. On occasion, he will step into a tie game in extra innings.

Otherwise, take the two setup men and work them on alternate days. Lowe is on standby to work the first day. The next day, Lowe gets the night off and League is on standby to work. Flip flop, rinse and repeat. Now, on a given night it's possible the designated short guy may not be needed. Felix could go eight strong innings and Aardsma can just take the ball in the 9th, or Felix could finish the game himself. In that case, it's your call whether to use the unused setup guy the next night or skip him turn and call on the other guy right on schedule. This setup guy will typically work the 8th, or 9th in a non-save situation. He'll be expected to face 3-6 batters, maybe less in the right situation.

The other three relievers? They will work in a three man rotation of their own. Each man, on his designated day, will take the ball when the starter is done, whether in the 7th or the 5th, and face up to the entire lineup a single time (up to 9 batters faced). Some days, he might only have to face 2-3 batters. Some days, he may need to face the entire lineup once. Rarely will it be bad enough that he faces nine guys and isn't at least part way through the 7th, if not to the 8th.

Obviously, this will usually require a lot of work for a reliever in this rotation, so each guy gets at least two days off following his outing. For example, Kelley will work one day, then Texeira the next, then White the next, and then back to Kelley. Rinse, repeat.

This schedule can be adjusted if need be. For example, maybe a middle reliever isn't needed on a given day, as Ryan Rowland Smith threads the needle for 7 innings so Wak goes with Lowe on his scheduled day in the 8th before turning to Aardsma. Thus the unused reliever can go the next day and give the other middle relievers an extra day off. Or maybe Ian Snell gets shelled the next day, and both the previously unused reliever and the middle man that was originally slated to go on Snell's day can each face 9 batters to bridge the gap. This would probably shorten the rest for one guy if you stay on the middle relief rotation, but it can typically be managed. A great start from another pitcher or a timely off day or rainout can get you back on track, or to a lesser extent a starter goes 6.1 innings and the overworked middle guy only has to work a couple batters or something.

A lot of dominos would have to fall for this plan to fail enough that you have to cave in and call in a 12th pitcher. If a guy gets hurt or something, DL or option him and call someone else up. Tacoma should have a fair share of options (Luke French, Garrett Olson and a couple others) than can step into either the middle relief rotation or setup rotation.

Coaches can change. Is Pete Carroll a better coach today?

After being introduced as the Seahawks' new head coach, Pete Carroll owned the shortcomings of his first stints as an NFL head coach during the 90's. Peter King has the money quote:

"I didn't know who the heck I was as a football coach. What transformed for me, before getting to USC -- between New England and SC -- was really, I had an epiphany of what was most important to me as a football coach. In that process of putting those thoughts together, it kind of just solidified a mentality and an approach that now has been put in practice for 10 years.

"I feel like I'm bringing a very, very clear message to our football team when we get in our meeting room. When we start this thing off, they're going to know where I'm coming from, because I know where I'm coming from ... The whole challenge here is to get the whole organization on the same page, everybody understands where we're coming from, what we're all about, where we're going, what we're doing. I didn't know that then. I didn't know it. And I'm almost embarrassed to tell you that I [was] coaching an NFL club and I didn't have my act together."

Coaches changing their approach later in their careers and becoming better coaches than before is hardly unprecedented. The most famous NFL example is Dick Vermeil, a workaholic, high-strung taskmaster during his successful Philadelphia Eagles stint (1976-1982) and during the first two years of his comeback with the St Louis Rams before he mellowed out in his 3rd season (to the point of crying at times in front of the media and his team), and, admittedly with the help of great skill-position players at receiver and tailback along with the surprise discovery of an Arena League quarterback who it turned out could play at the NFL level, he found his greatest glory with the Greatest Show on Turf and won a Super Bowl in 2000. He retired after that season, but came back to coach the Kansas City Chiefs and managed a strong 44-36 record between 2001-2005 with the same revised approach.

Now, the misgivings are going to remain until Pete Carroll strings together 11-12 win seasons, until his teams sport competitive running games, until his defense shows up in the NFL's top 10-15 every season and only if the Seahawks team we see in 2010 and beyond show up every Sunday and play competitive games that either end in victory or, when defeated, remain in doubt until the final moments.

But people can change, and if not for that none of us in life would ever get a chance to learn new careers, develop relationships with new people or ever try anything new. While his track record arouses suspicion over his ability to succeed as an NFL coach, that Pete Carroll owned his past NFL coaching failures and asserts that his decade as USC's coach has helped him grow into a better leader and a better coach is encouraging enough for me to say wait and see, even in retaining legitimate doubt.

The biggest concern with the Seahawks hiring Pete Carroll

Just 24 hours after dismissing head coach Jim Mora, the Seattle Seahawks are poised to hire current USC head coach Pete Carroll as not only their new head coach, but as dual general manager.

Now, let's never mind Carroll's okay-ish 33-31 record in two uninspiring NFL coaching jobs during the 1990's (Jets 1994, Patriots 1997-1999). Let's never mind that no NFL offense under Carroll ever finished higher than 11th in the league in total yards despite a talented offense led by Drew Bledsoe during his last three seasons, that only once did his offense or defense finish in the NFL's 10 top in yards gained/allowed any season (New England's defense did during his final year), or that his NFL teams' running games always finished in the bottom half of in the league (16th, 26th, 27th and 23rd in yards, respectively).

Let's never mind that Carroll inflated his current reputation with a comfortable USC gig where he always has recruiting access to some of the finest HS and JuCo football talent in the nation, let alone top recruits who want to play for USC badly enough to fall into his lap... working in one of college football's most prestigious and high profile schools, not to mention one with a vast amount of resources at the coach's disposal, and thus a place where it's very easy for a competent college coach to step in and quickly build a dominant program.

Let's never mind this fine USC career all came on the heels of replacing the overwhelmed Paul Hackett, an NFL offensive coordinator who save for a two year stint coaching small time UC Davis had never been the head coach for any team at any level, and who could do no better than .500 football despite a wealth of talent falling into his lap every year... and that as long as Carroll was capable, he would easily exceed Hackett's accomplishments and come out looking like a better coach, let alone look like a great coach when all those top recruiting classes produced 10-14 win season after 10-14 win season, with the occasional BCS title thrown in.

Let's never mind that the Seahawks brass bought into an inflated reputation and forgot the history of accomplished D-1 NCAA head coaches who have jumped to the NFL and floundered, forgetting that the list of such coaches in the modern era who have successfully made the jump and had a long, accomplished career consists of Jimmy Johnson, Bill Walsh (MAYBE John Robinson if you decide Super Bowls don't matter) and about 10 inches of empty space on the page... and that the list of failures and forgotten mediocrities is far longer.

******

No, the real concern with the Seahawks decision isn't that they hired Pete Carroll. You can make just as many arguments why you consider him the best man for the job despite everything that I mentioned as you can for why he's a bad choice. Given the potential pool of applicants, the Seahawks could have certainly done worse than to hire Carroll away from USC.

The real concern is that there was no selection process whatsoever. Not 24 hours after Jim Mora's dismissal, word was already out that the Seahawks were prepared to make Pete Carroll an offer he can't refuse (A token interview with Vikings coordinator Leslie Frazier, a black man, was offered solely to work around the NFL's Rooney Rule that requires a team interview one minority candidate for a head coaching position).

Twelve NFL teams make the postseason, and until each team is eliminated, their head and subordinate coaches may not be approached by any NFL team seeking new coaches. The Seahawks could have explored their options with other NFL assistant coaches, and waited until postseason's end to interview candidates. NFL assistants tend to translate to success as NFL head coaches far more frequently than college coaches. The Seahawks could have selected from many more qualified (and likely interested) candidates once the Super Bowl concluded, so that they would hurry to hire a college football coach now is baffling, especially given the team hasn't hired a new General Manager yet.

The only reason I could see the Seahawks justifiably hurrying to make a deal was that Carroll was in danger of committing elsewhere and he was by far their most preferred candidate. That doesn't make sense given Carroll himself was not a particularly hot commodity: Along with the reasons above, which many NFL front offices are acutely aware of, no other NFL team had shown interest in Carroll's services. But the real question is... whose preferred candidate was Pete Carroll? The team has no GM right now and the closest they have to such is CEO Tod Leiwecke, who isn't one to handle player/coach personnel decisions and has in fact been focused on finding a GM to make that decision for him.

Here's the rub: Reportedly, Mora's dismissal was requested by Seahawks owner Paul Allen, not exactly a reach given the team appeared to fall apart in the final month of a 5-11 season and Mora repeatedly pointed ill-advised fingers at players in lieu of taking responsibility as the head coach for the team's performance... not to mention scaled down and over-simplified the team's game plan, in turn facilitating the aging, injury-ravaged team's fall from grace in 2009.

But then it's likely the decision to hire Carroll was Allen's as well. The decisions smacks of a hasty lack of foresight, reason, and patience that would get a typical GM fired. Allen is a man of great hubris, and doesn't mind throwing his financial and political weight around to get what he wants. It would not be a stretch to assume that the order to fire Mora at once was quickly followed by an order to hire Carroll at once. And the team's hands are tied: It's Allen's money funding the team, and therefore if Allen wants the team to hire someone, they're essentially bound to his whims. If Allen wants the team to hire Pete Carroll, they're going to hire Pete Carroll.

How big of a problem is this sort of heavy hand? It reportedly ran Mike Holmgren out of town, though to be fair Holmgren's draft and personnel decisions as GM/coach weren't the best, and to some degree this year's team paid the price for his years of poor draft day decisions. But in light of Paul Allen's demands that the GM not have total roster control, it appears that this saga is an illustration of another power-mad team owner who thinks he knows more about football than the football experts he is paying to be football experts.

Football Strategic Concepts: Goal Setting on 1st and 2nd Down

The Hidden Game of Football discovered in research that a 1st down play improves the team's chances for success if it gets 45 percent of the needed yards. For example, on 1st and 10 that would be 4.5 yards: Your chances of success go up if you get 5 yards to make it 2nd and 5... but they go down if you gain 3 yards for 2nd and 7. On 1st and 20, success is getting at least 9 yards.

Likewise, 2nd down has a success bar: 60 percent of the needed yards. On 2 and 4, you need at least 2.4 yards, so 3 yards is a successful play but a 1 yard gain is not. On 2nd and 12, you need 7.2 yards, so 8-9 yards is a success but 5 yards gained is not.

3rd and 4th down barometers are simple: For success you need to get the 1st down, regardless of distance.

A football team looking to focus on offense can set a goal on every down using this information. On 1st and 10 the smart goal would be to get at least 5 yards. Perhaps the 60% goal on 2nd and 3, or the 45% goal on a fortuitous 1st and 5, seems a bit meager and weak. So in these cases you can say 'just get the first down'.

But on 2nd and 7, getting 5 yards is a reasonable goal to shoot for. On 1st and 20, needing to catch up after a dumb penalty, you can shoot for 9 yards. Obviously, there's little need for additional goal setting on 3rd or 4th down: Every football team is aiming for the 1st at this point if they're not kicking.

Bread and butter short or running plays become more valuable in this context over the more standard approaches like running and hoping for traction or daylight on 1st down, settling for 3-4 yards on 1st down, or throwing the bomb on 2nd down hoping to strike quick, and then gunning for the 1st on 3rd if it doesn't work. Taking a goal-set approach to every down with short, high percentage plays (whether varied run packages, quick strike or screen pass plays or West Coast and Spread style passing) is more conducive to long drives, wearing out the defense and reducing your opponent's opportunities by working the clock. The greater sense of purpose will help build momentum, put pressure on the defense early in drives and wear them down as drives proceed.

Likewise, on defense this can serve as a goal. On 1st and 10, draw a line 4.5 yards from the line of scrimmage and make it a goal not to let the opposition past it. Obviously passing plays make this a bit more complex, but the territorial mindset is easy to instill against running plays. Consider an opponent's 4 yard gain on 1st and 10 a success. Incomplete passes are obviously terrific as always. Holding the opponent to 2 yards on 2nd and 4 can be considered a success. Keep this idea under consideration in scheming with gap coverage and zone defenses.

Football Strategic Concepts: Four Drives (Two Touchdowns)

Four Drives is a goal-setting philosophy on offense with the goal to end no less than four drives in a game with a score, no less than two of which are touchdowns. The average NFL team scores between 14 and 28 points per game, and most final scores fall into that territory. College scores can vary more wildly, but in general engineering four scoring drives gives you a significant chance of winning. Assuming extra points are made, Four Drives should get you to at least 20 points and give you a sizable non-zero chance of winning if your team manages no other miscellaneous scores.

Part of the idea is to run time off the clock, rest your defense and wear down the opposing defense with a drive. Even if a lengthy drive ends in a field goal, by moving the football against the other defense, you establish momentum that your opponent now has to work against.

Because of the focus on working the clock and wearing the defense, my definition of what constitutes a drive is a bit more stringent. Technically, if you recover a turnover on your opponent's 30 yard line or run a kick into opposing territory, run three ineffective downs and kick a field goal, that's a drive.

But such a possession does not count as a drive under Four Drives. It does not work the clock, puts your defense back on the field quickly and though it ends in a score, it ends in a cheap score, a field goal, after a golden opportunity in the form of a turnover in opposing territory. Turnovers by opponents in their own end should generally lead to touchdowns.

Therefore, a possession only counts as a drive under Four Drives if it A) begins in your own territory or B) a drive starting in opposing territory required at least one first down and ends with a touchdown. Notice with each of those qualifiers that your team must pass at least one first down marker, if not several, during the course of a drive, whether or not they actually net one or more first downs (if they score a long touchdown, then great, but for all those other times you'll need to gain first downs).

(To clarify requirement B, this only means that the drive does not begin with a 1st and Goal situation, as a 1st and Goal drive is clearly short and while trying, will not wear the defense since no more than 3-4 plays will be run. The drive needs to begin with the first down marker being outside of the goal line, requiring that you drive at least 10-11 yards to score.)

Also, Four Drives does not include pick sixes, kick return touchdowns or fumbles run back for a touchdown. Consider these bonus scores, but you still need to engineer your Four Drives. In the event that you somehow rattle off so many turnover scores that you don't have time to feasibly run four qualifying drives in a four quarter game, consider yourself very lucky: You're probably destroying your opponent and the game is essentially over. Thank your stars, put in the backups and kill the clock.

If you engineer four scoring drives per the Four Drives definitions, and you avoid making any more than a couple turnovers, you will probably win the majority of your football games, almost regardless of how your defense plays. It is impossible to run four scoring drives under these terms and not have a fair share of time of possession, or have allowed more than 30-35 points: The other offense simply won't have as much time to engineer drives of their own, plus will be under pressure to produce if their early drives stall and your drives don't and could press into mistakes or hurry up football that gets the ball back in your hands more quickly and gives you another chance to eat the clock and wear out their defense with another drive.

Found: Mike Marshall's pitching rotation

Previously I mentioned an old article by Mike Marshall about how he would structure a rotation and bullpen that I could not find.

I finally found it. Why it didn't come up in my prior searches is beyond me, but this is definitely the article I read 10-11 years ago on how Marshall would construct a pitching rotation.

It mostly confirms what I remembered, but it turns out his pitching staff would only have 8-9 guys, and he would use the rotation pitchers more than I thought. They would in fact be his middle relievers, and he'd even go as far as to send them one time through an entire lineup if he had to. His bullpen would only have three men: Two alternating closers who worked the 9th inning on alternating games, and one mop up guy to get the team through the 6th if the starter got shelled.

Football coaching resources

Taking a little more than a passing interest in football strategy and analysis, I have stumbled upon the following resources:

Football Outsiders: Football's attempt at sabermetric-style analysis. The differences in variables between baseball and football pose a challenge to this approach, but FO offers an admirable effort to bridge the gap.

American Football Association: An organization devoted to the promotion of semi-pro and minor league football.

Gridiron Strategies: A site devoted to football coaching strategies.

Reference as you please.

The long lost Marshall Plan for bullpen management

Back in 1997 when I first started college at UNLV, despite studying theatre I still had a keen interest in sports. The old James Dickinson Library had a wealth of sports coaching materials: Old football playbooks, coaching guides for all sports, and a large archive of sports coaching magazines.

One day I stumbled upon an article featuring an interview with former pitcher and pitching coach Mike Marshall, blackballed from the Majors for a unique approach to developing pitchers that incumbent coaches, managers and owners consider a threat to the establishment and/or the health of their pitchers (even though there's a(n un)healthy rate of pitcher attrition under the status quo). (This and this are NOT from the interview in question. They're from a separate interview with BP's Jonah Keri, but will give you a good idea of where Marshall is coming from.)

What was interesting is that the article outlined a complete strategy from Marshall on managing an entire pitching staff. The plan, from memory:

- Every pitcher in the rotation would have a strict limit of 27 batters to face. If he got shelled, you could remove him early, but he is to face no more than 27 batters. The reason, which is discussed in the piece I linked above, is that familiarity and fatigue take away many of the pitcher's advantages once he faces hitters a 4th time.

- Instead of a closer, you would have two alternating short relievers commissioned to finish the final 1-2 innings (typically one) on alternating days, guaranteeing at least one day off after pitching for each reliever.

- You would also have two middle relievers to help bridge the gap between the 27th batter and the designated short reliever finishing the game, or to work in extra innings. Though you could make these relievers specialists (such as a lefty specialist and a groundball specialist for double play ball situations, as many managers do), Marshall's methods encourage the development of pitcher modularity (the ability to pitch effectively to any hitter in any situation) and thus there ideally wouldn't be a need for specialists per se.

- One other pitcher can then serve as the long reliever for those cases when the starter gets shelled or otherwise has to leave early, or if the game goes to extra innings and other available relievers have been used. This would give you a bullpen of 10 men (In this piece, Marshall used a five man rotation even though in the interview above he advocates usage of a four man rotation, likely deferring to the status quo in MLB and the minors).

- Here's the kicker: The starting pitcher that threw two days before is also made available in the bullpen if needed. He can throw to 1-2 batters in a pinch during the middle innings, or fill in a blank if several pitchers are for whatever reason already burned.

To date I have not been able to find the article online. I have found multiple interviews from Marshall, obviously (he is a somewhat popular interview) but have yet to find the piece where he outlines this strategy. As a result, in describing it from memory I may have omitted some details. If you are able to correct me, that is more than welcome because it means you've read the piece and might know where to find it.

NFL teams don't run the option. Should they?

At this point, I think it's best to just put returner/receiver/former college quarterback Josh Cribbs behind center on every play. The Browns are at their most dynamic offensively with Cribbs in the shotgun, running their "Flash" package (their version of the Wildcat), and it isn't as if there's anyone qualified to throw Cribbs, or Braylon Edwards(notes), or anyone else, the ball. If the Browns hope to be competitive at all, they should scrap the traditional offense altogether and go option-read all the way. Or, they can alternate between two quarterback disasters in perpetuity, until the latest Belichick disciple is fired and they start this nightmare all over again.

Granted, Doug Farrar is half-joking, but it does lead me to wonder. Dozens of college football teams run some variation of the option (Triple Option, Wishbone, etc) with varying degrees of success. The QB throws maybe half a dozen times a game and despite the other team knowing you're going to run the ball, you can frequently rack up 200-300 yards on the ground with the QB and 3-4 different backs.

Many college teams do this because it works, and they don't have the talent at QB and receiver to competently run a passing or pro style offense. Running the ball is easier to do, it runs the clock when you succeed at it and it shortens the game, minimizing your opponent's opportunities to succeed even if you don't capitalize on yours. Sure, if you run into an opponent whose defense is just bigger, faster and stronger than your's, you're probably dead meat, but few fit the criteria well enough to stuff every hole in a system that attacks with diverse looks, cuts and angles. The option is football's version of basketball's Princeton offense.

Why have we never seen an NFL team try to run such an offense? The most common argument is that NFL defenses are talented, fast, strong and well prepared, if not well coached... and that such an offense would die a quick, zero point death after the defense stacks nine guys in the box and just bum rushes whoever carries the ball.

However, 1) NFL teams don't need to run a straight option and 2) The recent success of the option-style Wildcat package shows that an NFL team can move the ball with such a system.

Even the crappiest NFL teams have some QB and receiver talent. Pretty much every QB in the NFL has shown he can capably run a passing offense at some point in his life. Many were option QBs themselves. Many tailbacks and receivers were once QBs themselves. Chiefs QB Tyler Thigpen may suck as an NFL pocket passer, but the reason he's even in the NFL is that at some point in college, he proved himself a capable QB that can read a defense and complete passes against an attacking defense. You don't get to be an NFL QB unless you succeed in college football as a QB. Josh Cribbs himself was a QB once before becoming a receiver and return man. There are so many examples in the league past and present that I'm about to overlook.

If lining up in a pro set and running the usual isn't getting you anywhere, then why not line up shotgun every play and roll the QB to one side with orders to either find an open receiver, reverse to a receiver or back running the other way, or tuck it and go? Or even line up with two TEs or a back in the slot... and shift to a wishbone when the other team has their nickel package on the field? Or when the other team loads the box after a gazillion straight running plays, send your top receiver streaking up-field, slip the tight end 5-10 yards downfield, go play-action and just kill them dead with a bomb or a screen pass? And every now and then, you can screw with the defense by running a straight play from the gun or a single wing and exploiting any basic weaknesses in the adjusted coverage.

It's not like running an option-style offense would leave you totally predictable and one dimensional. A triple shoot style option could scramble a defense's collective brain and leave the defensive coordinator's head in his hands at halftime.

If you were a bad team appearing doomed to a terrible season, why would you not at least try something like this? You have nothing to lose except 12-16 games and your job (which you'd lose anyway under the status quo).

Item in Petr King's column that may interest only me

On Wednesday, in Kansas City for a series with the Royals, a group of eight members of the Red Sox traveling party -- including manager Terry Francona and infielder Kevin Youkilis -- spent a couple of hours at the Kansas City Chiefs' offices and training facility, across the parking lot from Kauffman Stadium. Francona is close to Chiefs GM Scott Pioli from his days in New England, and Pioli visited Francona in the Red Sox clubhouse prior to Tuesday's game. Youkilis and former major-leaguer Sean Casey, now a part-time TV colorman, kept commenting about the pace and fury of the midweek practice. Said coach Todd Haley: "They were very shocked how physical we were and how hard our coaches coached."

Hmm... now, I know Mike Singletary has used a similar approach to make a competitive ballclub out of a crappy 49ers team. But also keep in mind that before he became Kurt Warner's weepy Super Bowl coach, Dick Vermeil ran his St Louis Rams ragged after taking over as their coach, ranting and screaming and nutsing his way through practice... and those teams lost double digit games in each of Vermeil's first couple years.

The saying goes, "Work smarter, not harder," and sometimes, a team that works too hard in practice can find themselves too beaten and gassed to compete on Sunday. This is a clue that maybe the Chiefs are working too hard, but not very smart.

Mike Singletary's team is physical, but a) he doesn't conduct himself like a madman. He is, as he has always been, a fairly reserved man who speaks with impact once he does talk. And b) the Niners follow a fairly simple game plan centered around the line of scrimmage on both sides of the ball, and a fairly good tailback in Frank Gore: Run the ball, control the clock, hit them in the mush and control the line of scrimmage on both sides of the ball with force.

Says the Kansas City Star:

Right now, Todd Haley and Scott Egoli are in way over their heads. They’ve taken the scraps Herm Edwards and Carl Peterson left, supported them with spare parts from New England, emasculated them with intimidation tactics that allegedly foster a culture of winning and created a team far worse than anything we’ve seen represent our city.

The Chiefs committed 10 penalties in this week's blowout loss to Philly, while trying and failing to run the football.

The Chiefs admittedly don't have a Frank Gore in the backfield (Larry Johnson's seen better days), but the difference here may be the coaches hanging all over guys all through practice with berating and threats. It's hard enough to go through very physical practices, but another to be constantly jerked around by coaches that may or may not know what they're doing. Treat a guy like a screw-up and... well, guess what? He's probably going to play like one. Niners coaching may jump on guys, but the approach is more positive, and so are the results.

The Green Death was ironically the death of this girl’s soccer coach

http://www.patriotledger.com/sports/x575725578/-Green-Death-coach-resigns

The e-mail linked above got Michael Kinahan, a girl's soccer coach, forced out of his job as a hard-nosed coach of a team he dubbed "Green Death", before the season began. Key text from the e-mail below:

The kids will run, they will fall, get bumps, bruises and even bleed a little. Big deal, it’s good for them (but I do hope the other team is the one bleeding). If the refs can’t handle a little criticism, then they should turn in their whistle. The sooner they figure out how to make a decision and live with the consequences the better. My heckling of the refs is actually helping them develop as people. The political correctness police are not welcome on my sidelines. America’s youth is becoming fat, lazy and non-competitive because competition is viewed as “bad”. I argue that competition is good and is important to the evolution of our species and our survival in what has become an increasingly competitive global economy and dangerous world. Second place trophies are nothing to be proud of as they serve only as a reminder that you missed your goal; their only useful purpose is as an inspiration to do that next set of reps. Do you go to a job interview and not care about winning? Don’t animals eat what they kill (and yes, someone actually kills the meat we eat too – it isn’t grown in plastic wrap)? And speaking of meat, I expect that the ladies be put on a diet of fish, undercooked red meat and lots of veggies. No junk food. Protein shakes are encouraged, and while blood doping and HGH use is frowned upon, there is no testing policy. And at the risk of stating the obvious, blue slushies are for winners.

These are my views and not necessarily the views of the league (but they should be). I recognize that my school of thought may be an ideological shift from conventional norms. But it is imperative that we all fight the good fight, get involved now and resist the urge to become sweat-xedo-wearing yuppies who sit on the sidelines in their LL Bean chairs sipping mocha-latte-half-caf-chinos while discussing reality TV and home decorating with other feeble-minded folks. I want to hear cheering, I want to hear encouragement, I want to get the team pumped up at each and every game and know they are playing for something.

I think a) he took it too far without any sort of wink/nudge and b) the sort of soft, comfort-zone driven mentality that led to the hearty backlash is one of the reasons why the United States gets their asses kicked at World Cup soccer every four years.

(No, I’m not counting the fledgling women’s world cup because the U.S. is the only country whose nation’s girls and women seriously participate in the sport en masse, and therefore own a massive advantage. The WWC is a glorified exhibition designed to put the U.S. women over and will be for at least the next 20 years.)

Also, the guy may have helped his case with a few extra paragraph breaks. Holy manifesto, Batman.