State taxes and professional athletes

I woke this morning to Colin Cowherd on ESPN radio. In the middle of his rant on valuing Billy Mays' death over Michael Jackson's... he suddenly segues for a brief moment (before cutting to commercial and resuming his Mays/Jackson afterward) into the topic of Oregon raising their state tax from 9% to 11% for its top tax bracket.

Cowherd argues that a pro athlete considering signing with the NBA's Portland Trailblazers has to consider that they'll lose that 11% of their income signing there, and how states like Florida and Texas have an advantage when signing top talent because of their lack of a state tax.

Granted, it's a key issue to consider. However, Washington's lack of a state tax hasn't offered the Seattle Mariners, Seahawks and (until they were taken away) Supersonics much of an advantage in luring top talent away. In fact, it's geographic distance from the rest of the US has rendered those teams just as much of a disadvantage. The Tennessee Titans, Nashville Predators and Memphis Grizzles don't see significant advantages in signing talent in their respective leagues just because Tennessee doesn't have an income tax.

Conversely, major markets like New York City, Chicago and Los Angeles have state taxes and even very high costs of living, yet it hasn't deterred top athletes from signing with the Yankees, Knicks, Rangers, Jets and Giants (yes, both NFL teams technically play in New Jersey... which also has a state tax)... or the Lakers, Dodgers, Kings and Angels... or the Bulls, Bears, Cubs, Blackhawks and White Sox.

In noting Texas and Florida, Cowherd neglects to mention that both states are still considered by much of the population as great places to live. Florida, obviously, is a tropical paradise: It's little wonder much of the nation elects to retire there. And Texas is considered the heart of the South, the perfect blend of urban sophistication and rural country life, with a good dose of emigrated Latino culture and a ton of wide open space at an affordable price. And as crazy as summer and autumn storms may get, the winters are fairly mild compared to the rest of the country.

And when it comes to the major markets, the best teams with the most money to spend on top talent often roost there, and great players are going to flock to great teams that offer them significant loads of money regardless of the tax situation. Once you're making millions of dollars, most can't tell the difference between a state tax and no state tax anyway. Most of it's going in the bank either way. Guys sign with the Yankees to win a World Series... not because of a favorable tax situation.

While state taxes are certainly a factor, they are rarely a major factor compared to other factors such as the quality of the team and the quality of the locale. Most of these guys are getting millions of dollars hand over fist and couldn't care less about the tax situation.

What do to with Jarrod Washburn?

Two overpaid Bavasi pitcher signings, Jarrod Washburn and Miguel Batista, are slated to come off the books after this season. Even if the Mariners are in contention, the team may consider dealing these unspectacular contract-year players to get some sort of return if doing so will help them stockpile more talent for the future. In Batista’s case, he is an absolute tomato can at this point, and probably commands no trade value. The M’s can release him for all they care, because they’re probably eating every dollar of the $9 million Batista’s owed this season one way or another. The best they can get for Batista in a trade, even if they offer to eat his salary, is cash considerations or some crappy A-baller.

Washburn’s case presents an interesting challenge. His $10.35 million due to him this season doesn’t make him an attractive value either, and the M’s would likely have to eat it to deal him. He’s not spectacular, but he can give a rotation 150-180 useful innings in the 4.50-4.75 ERA neighborhood over a full season. That’s better than most of the tomato cans and untested rookies teams will try in the #5 slot this year.

One argument for holding onto an impending free agent of reasonable quality and letting him walk is that, should you offer him arbitration after the walk year and he refuses, you get draft picks when he leaves. Last year, offering arbitration to Raul Ibañez was a smart move because Raul had the highest free agent distinction, Type A, which netted the Mariners a 1st round draft pick in 2009 from the Phillies when Philadelphia signed him.

However, such a move might not work as well for Washburn. Any team that signs a Type A or B free agent loses one of their top draft picks in the next draft. Ibañez was a 20-30 home run middle of the order bat whose services were in relatively great demand, so losing a pick didn’t matter much to Philly, because in return they got an effective veteran power bat.

Washburn, while reliable as a low-end starting pitcher, doesn’t exactly add a ton of value. There are a lot of low-end starting pitchers that can give you 5-6 non-embarrassing innings every five days on the market. There are few teams willing to part with a 1st or 2nd round pick just to get Jarrod Washburn, where there are a lot of pitchers like Jarrod Washburn that will cost far less, or might even be waiting in their farm system.

Refusing to trade Jarrod Washburn, then offering him arbitration, could backfire as a talent-acquisition ploy for one reason: he might accept arbitration, and then you’re stuck with him in 2010 for a price tag similar to the $10.35 mil he’s making this season. See, if teams will balk at signing Washburn during the 2009-2010 offseason because they don’t want to lose a draft pick for him, Jarrod and his agent may realize his hands are tied, and he may just take the arbitration offer.

While holding on to Raul Ibañez until his contract expired and offering him arbitration was a smart move in his case for acquiring new talent, it would not work for Jarrod Washburn. The best chance at a return in Washburn’s case would be to trade him to a team needing help in the back of their rotation during a playoff chase, as they may blink and offer a decent prospect in return.

One obvious trading partner is a team Washburn openly lobbied for: the Minnesota Twins. With the replacement-level Glen Perkins logging innings at the back of their rotation and the always distinct possibility that one of their front liners (Scott Baker or Francisco Liriano) returns to the DL, the Twins may pine for a capable starter to fill in a key blank if they’re still in the playoff hunt, which is quite possible despite their weak offense. There is also the nearby Milwaukee Brewers, which continues to hand starts to Dave Bush and Jeff Suppan, plus has a shaky Yovani Gallardo and an ordinary Braden Looper leading their rotation. If there’s still hanging around in June and July, they’re going to want some help, and they have plenty of farm talent from which to offer the Mariners something in return.

But to hold onto Washburn, offer arbitration and hope for a sandwich pick will backfire. It’s unlikely a team will risk a draft pick to sign the ordinary Washburn, and also likely Washburn accepts arbitration and fills in the Mariners rotation for yet another year, which won’t net you any new talent in return.

College coaches and commitment to their schools

John Chaney at Temple. Lute Olson at Arizona. Mike Krzyzewski at Duke. Jim Boeheim at Syracuse and Jim Calhoun at UConn. Most great college basketball head coaches are historically considered synonymous with their school, spending the length of their career zenith under that one roof and leaving only via retirement. Even Bob Knight at Indiana and Jerry Tarkanian at UNLV departed their schools after many years due to scandal, rather than what leads coaches away from their alma maters now.

Tony Bennett takes over for his father at Washington State… and three years later jumps ship to coach at Virginia. John Calipari, the morally questionable college coach of great success at UMass who recently built a juggernaut program at Memphis… has now agreed to coach at Kentucky. When the Kentucky opening emerged, the media immediately jumped on UCLA coach Ben Howland (who himself took that job after jumping from Pittsburgh) to ask if HE would jump ship to take the Kentucky job.

College coaches used to seek glory by presiding over a winning program, and some still do. Despite his meandering career as a successful coach, it doesn’t appear Rick Pitino is leaving his successful Louisville program anytime soon (though I suppose we can check back in a year). Roy Williams jumped ship from his successful career at Kansas only because his current job at North Carolina, his alma mater, was his dream job. He’s not going anywhere. I mentioned Boeheim, Coach K and Calhoun.

But still we see a growing trend of hit and run repair jobs at college programs by successful coaches who commit long enough to recruit and coach middling teams into winners, and either get quickly bored or see fool’s gold when a high profile coaching opening comes along. My hometown school, UNLV, has a basketball coach who was the king of hit and run program building: Lon Kruger. Krueger presided over rebuilds in: Texas Pan-American, Kansas State, Florida, Illinois and now (following an ill-advised NBA coaching job with the Atlanta Hawks) UNLV. Despite watching the Runnin’ Rebels stumble into the NIT this season, Kruger had to fend off rumors that he considered jumping ship to yet another program. To his credit, this was his 5th season at UNLV, the 2nd longest tenure he’s spent at any one program in his 23 year coaching career (to his six years in Florida), so maybe he’s settled down. Maybe.

How must a recruit feel about signing up to play for a coach that might not be around next season if an attractive coaching vacancy opens up? How do the kids at Memphis feel about their coach jumping ship? How about the Cougs at Washington State? No, I’m not talking about the one and done high school superstars who jerk around in class and score 20 points a game as hired guns until they can enter the NBA draft… but the honest to goodness talents a step or two down that are probably going to get an actual degree and stay all four years. I know 18 year old kids recruited for their basketball skills aren’t the most forward thinking, prescient individuals, and that in itself is probably why a Calipari, a Billy Donovan or Lon Kruger can get away with promises of commitment in exchange for the player’s four year commitment despite the coach’s track record for jumping ship.

If not for that, I would think the careers of these coaches would eventually dry up, as top recruits looking for a commitment wouldn’t commit to a non-committal coach, and recruiting top talent is (sadly) a large part of the battle in NCAA Division I college basketball. But since most kids are just looking for a place to play, where they have a chance to get significant minutes in important games and maybe play on a winning team, and many top recruits aren’t planning to commit for more than 1-2 years anyway, the trend of big coach hopping will likely continue in earnest unabated, since kids will continue to place their trust in these hired guns posing as mentors.

Where experience doesn't pay

Several name QBs in the NFL with a track record of experience don't have jobs right now, guys like Jeff Garcia, Kyle Boller, Byron Leftwich and Chicago's favorite instant turnover device, Rex Grossman. Meanwhile, inexperienced no names like J.T. O'Sullivan and Dan Orlovsky have jobs with teams.

First of all, this belies a common paradox: young players under contract, such as backup QBs, often remain under team control for a few years at a low cost. Even if their contracts expire, they usually hit a period of restricted free agency, where they can't leave without costing their new team draft picks, before they become unrestricted free agents and can demand large sums of money. Young players are easier for teams to keep around because they're cheap and easy to retain.

So you usually see points in the offseason where veteran QBs don't have jobs, but inexperienced young backup QBs do. That's just the way contracts shake out. Veterans' contracts expire and teams aren't quick to snap them up, especially when they already have a capable starter and 2-3 backups in house.

Tucker speculates that teams don't want to bring in a proven starter, make him a backup and risk creating a clubhouse cancer situation where the veteran gets disgruntled with his backup role.

I'm not sure that's the case with these QBs.

- Garcia took on backup roles with Philadelphia and Tampa Bay without much fuss, and that he eventually ended up starting was purely a product of circumstance: the guys ahead of him got injured or didn't perform.
- Leftwich took on a backup role in Pittsburgh and Atlanta without much fuss after washing out with Jacksonville.
- Boller and Grossman are at this point washouts and would probably have no problem as backups. Boller, in fact, has spent most of his career as a backup or transition starter at QB.

The only player among that list that might pitch a hissy over holding a clipboard on Sunday is Grossman, and honestly he's probably the least qualified of all of them given his interception fetish.

Now, this assumes that these guys won't just sign late in the offseason as many veterans do, but even then it holds: The real reason teams aren't in a hurry to sign veterans is because veterans cost more money than younger players, and every NFL team is under a salary cap.

Most teams have their starting spots accounted for, and the offseason began this way. Few teams had a need for a starting QB, and basically all of them quickly met the need (with the notable exception of the Jets, who watched Brett Favre retire for the umpteenth time). All these other teams have incumbent QBs, and to upgrade not only gets into the issue of unceremoniously dumping the incumbent, but now you have to add several million dollars to a payroll that likely is already fairly close to the salary cap, which hinders your ability to build an effective 53 man roster.

Now, why go through that just to add marginal depth at QB from a middling veteran, when you could just add a young QB at the league minimum instead? Even if he could be all that much worse than the veteran, the guy's probably going to spend most of the year on the bench or running the practice squad offense anyway.

So really, the Garcias and Bollers and Grossmans of the world aren't a victim of a complacent status quo, but caught in the no man's land of NFL economics. That gets into the whole salary cap debate, and that's where I'm going to leave this subject behind.

(Don't worry. They'll land somewhere before August.)

Two brief examples of Chicken Little Sports Media and a Lack of Foresight In the Name of Sensationalism

1. Manny Ramirez has re-signed with the Dodgers. Despite the media hysteria when both sides balked at the other’s respective offer, there was never any doubt he would re-sign.

Where else was he going to go? Who else was going to pay more money for a productive but aging slugger with no defensive range in LF? Who had the money? Who among those who had the money was going to scrap their incumbent lineup and game plan in the middle of Spring Training to pay out the nose for a defensive liability with attitude issues, just for the added offense that may or may not be in age-related decline? Where else was Manny shopping his trade besides Los Angeles?

Ned Colletti loves veteran stars and the Dodgers have plenty of money to burn. The two sides were close on a deal before the media hysteria. There was no way Manny was going anywhere else.

2. Kurt Warner re-signed with the Arizona Cardinals, and despite the media hysteria when Warner turned down the Cards’ initial offer and entertained an offer from the San Francisco 49ers, there was never any real doubt that he would return.

The Cards just came off an incredible Super Bowl run and still retain many of the parts they would need to repeat that run. The 49ers, despite some solid player development by new coach Mike Singletary, have a long way to go before they field a competitive unit. Why would Warner, chasing one more ring before retirement, jump ship from a team that can get him there and take a couple extra million dollars just to run for his life around a patchwork, fledgling offensive unit, on a team that could go 8-8 with some breaks? And who else needs a starting quarterback besides the 49ers and Cardinals? Pretty much every team has the position accounted for. The two sides were close on a deal before Warner went fishing, the only real difference being Warner wanting an extra year, and the Cards’ only other alternative at QB was young party animal Matt Leinart, who is rapidly approaching Bust status. There was no way a deal wasn’t getting done.

Al Davis and a $45 million wrecking ball

Execs taken aback by Asomugha, Lechler deals

By Jason Cole

INDIANAPOLIS – Reaction was swift and ugly Thursday to the deals the Oakland Raiders gave CB Nnamdi Asomugha and punter Shane Lechler over the past two days.

"How many different ways can you say, 'What were they thinking?' " a team executive who declined to be identified said after being told the terms of Asomugha's three-year, $45 million contract.

"Insanity, stupidity, whatever you want to attach to it. Yeah, the kid is the best cornerback in the league. They paid for quality. I'll give them that. But that deal wrecks the league. Absolutely wrecks it. … I'm sure Al doesn't care, but it's deals like that that change the league for the worse."

Actually, that last point alone probably explains the move.

Sure, Al Davis just bloated his payroll by paying a starting corner $15 million a year... but by paying such a high price, he has performed a little sports economics trick called setting the market.

By paying a top corner like Asomugha $45 million over 3 seasons, every other talented free agent corner will demand that a prospective team pay them at least that much for their services. You know agents like Drew Rosenhaus will take this line of negotiation and refuse any deal for his players that isn't close to Asomugha's salary. Likewise, by signing punter Shane Lechler (a punter!) for 4 years and $16 million, Davis has set a ridiculous price at two positions.

Even if most teams balk at paying such a price to subsequent top talent at these positions... if one team with, say, a desperate need at a position caves and offers a particular top player the requested cash, that's all that matters: Aside from further solidifying the excessive market price, now that particular team has bloated their payroll by an excessive amount for the services of one player, while they still need to find a way to get 52 other players paid under the salary cap, and field a competitive NFL team in the process.

In effect, Al Davis' ridiculous contract for Asomugha screws the payrolls of his competitors. With every team working against the mandated NFL salary cap, they now also have to deal with top corners in the league asking exorbitant prices. As Cole mentions later in the article, the deal could also have a ripple effect on negotiations with top players in other positions, such as free agent defensive lineman Albert Haynesworth.

If NFL teams don't sign these players, they now have to scramble to procure other, often lesser talent, who themselves ask for bloated wages in comparison to the bloated salaries of top players such as Asomugha. Davis has set the market so high that it chop-blocks the efforts of his competitors to build a competitive team.

Couldn't other teams in the league just refuse to pay any corner that much and in effect bring the price down? Sure, never minding the risk of charges of collusion, which would be true if every team actively stonewalled said players. But again, all it takes is one GM caving in and offering the requested money to a top free agent, and it's all for naught.

Sure, you can also say Davis has screwed himself by setting high prices. But he's also got a top player (and a punter) locked up. The other NFL teams scrambling to fill roster needs not only cannot say the same, but now must do so at a premium. Al Davis, in effect, has taken a $45 million wrecking ball to several teams' offseasons.